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The Elkins Legislation:  Will 
California Change Family  
Law Again? 
Steven K. Berenson* 
INTRODUCTION 
For many years, California has been at the forefront of 
innovations in the area of family law.  For example, in 1970, 
California became the first state to apply a no-fault law relating 
to dissolutions of marriage.1  California was the first state to 
mandate mediation in child custody and visitation disputes.2  
California was also the first state to recognize that unmarried 
cohabitants might have rights to share in property accumulated 
by their partner during the course of their relationship.3 
Recently, California enacted what may prove to be the most 
significant changes to its Family Code in the last two decades.4  
While the legislation contains a large number of changes, three of 
the changes will be the focus of this article.  First, California law 
now contains a preference for the introduction of live testimony 
in court hearings in family law matters.  Second, the legislation 
modifies the role of minor’s counsel in child custody proceedings 
to more closely resemble that of an attorney for one of the adult 
parties to a lawsuit, than that of a guardian ad litem.  Third, the 
legislation increases the likelihood that children will testify in 
custody proceedings.5 
 
 * Professor of Law, Thomas Jefferson School of Law, San Diego, California.  The 
author wishes to thank Nicola Boothe-Perry, Judith Fox, Michele Gilman, and Mary 
Spector for helpful comments on an earlier draft, and Deanna Sampson for continuing 
support. 
 1 See Herma Hill Kay, An Appraisal of California’s No-Fault Divorce Law, 75 CAL. 
L. REV. 291, 291–92 (1987). 
 2 Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE 
L.J. 1545, 1552 (1991). 
 3 Marsha Garrison, Nonmarital Cohabitation: Social Revolution and Legal 
Regulation, 42 FAM. L.Q. 309, 314 (2008). 
 4 See infra Part III.  The California Legislature passed two bills amending the 
California Family Code. See Assemb. B. 939, 2009–2010 Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010); 
Assemb. B. 1050, 2009–2010 Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010). 
 5 See infra Part III. 
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These changes are significant because they represent a clear 
break from a decades-long trend in family law, both in California 
and across the entire country away from reliance on traditional 
methods of adversary litigation in resolving family law disputes, 
particularly in cases involving issues of child custody and 
visitation.  This trend has been so dramatic that it has been 
described by scholars as a “paradigm shift”6 and a “revolution.”7  
Indeed, the move to no-fault divorce in California, and then 
elsewhere across the country, as well as the introduction of 
mandatory mediation in child custody cases, first in California 
and then elsewhere across the country, represent major 
contributions to the trend away from adversarial litigation in 
family law cases.  Other examples of this trend include the 
advent and spread of collaborative divorce methods, parenting 
coordination, high conflict couples counseling, and hybrid-
mediation-evaluation processes.8  The California legislative 
changes that are the focus here represent a stunning reversal of 
course for a state that has led the movement away from 
traditional adversary litigation methods in family law cases and 
represent a movement back in the direction of resolving family 
law matters in California through traditional adversary 
litigation. 
The genesis of the statutory changes in discussion here lies 
in the recent decision of the California Supreme Court in the case 
of Elkins v. Superior Court.9  Elkins involved a dissolution of 
marriage action from Contra Costa County, California.10  
Pursuant to local rules of court, all direct testimony in family law 
trials was to be provided in the form of written declarations, 
 
 6 See, e.g., Jane C. Murphy, Revitalizing the Adversary System in Family Law, 78 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 891, 894 (2010); ANDREW I. SCHEPARD, CHILDREN, COURTS, AND CUSTODY: 
INTERDISCIPLINARY MODELS FOR DIVORCING FAMILIES 175 (2004) [hereinafter SCHEPARD, 
CHILDREN, COURTS]; Jana B. Singer, Dispute Resolution and the Postdivorce Family: 
Implications of a Paradigm Shift, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 363, 363 (2009). 
 7 Deborah J. Cantrell, The Role of Equipoise in Family Law 2 (Univ. of Colo. Law 
Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 04-11, 2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1805927. 
 8 See, e.g., John Lande & Gregg Herman, Fitting the Forum to the Family Fuss: 
Choosing Mediation, Collaborative Law, or Cooperative Law for Negotiating Divorce 
Cases, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 280, 280–88 (2004) (discussing the advantages and disadvantages 
of mediation, collaborative law, and cooperative law in family law proceedings); Peter 
Salem, Debra Kulak & Robin M. Deutsch, Triaging Court Services: The Connecticut 
Judicial Branch’s Family Civil Intake Screen, 27 PACE L. REV. 741, 745 (2007) (discussing 
high conflict counseling, hybrid mediation-evaluation processes, and collaborative divorce 
methods); Andrew Schepard & Peter Salem, Foreword to the Special Issue on the Family 
Law Education Reform Project, 44 FAM. CT. REV. 513, 516 (2006) (noting the rise of 
collaborative dispute resolution in family law cases); Singer, supra note 6, at 364 & n.5. 
 9 Elkins v. Superior Court, 163 P.3d 160 (Cal. 2007). 
 10 Id. at 161. 
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though cross-examination would be permitted at the hearing.11  
Additionally, all trial exhibits were required to be filed prior to 
the hearing, with the evidentiary basis for each exhibit set forth 
in the written declarations.12  In Elkins, the husband, who was 
not represented by counsel, ultimately failed to comply with the 
aforementioned local rules by not submitting any admissible 
evidence for the court to consider in the divorce trial.13  Given the 
absence of any evidence submitted on behalf of the husband, the 
trial court, not surprisingly, issued a ruling that favored the wife 
with regard to each of the disputed issues.14  On appeal,15 the 
California Supreme Court ruled that the superior court’s local 
rules violated state statutes relating to hearsay evidence and 
affording litigants a “day in court.”16  The high court struck down 
the local court’s rules,17 and reversed the judgment in the 
dissolution of marriage case, remanding the case for further 
proceedings consistent with its opinion.18 
More importantly for present purposes, numerous counties 
around California had adopted local rules that were similar to 
those that were struck down in Elkins.19  The purpose behind 
such rules was to increase efficiency and the timely resolution of 
cases in light of the crushingly large caseloads in family courts 
around California.20  While the California Supreme Court 
acknowledged the legitimacy of these goals, it went on to 
conclude that courts’ bona fide interests in efficiency cannot 
trump individual litigants’ right to fair judicial proceedings.21  In 
any event, recognizing that the issues involved went well beyond 
the interests of solely the parties to the Elkins case, the court 
recommended that the California Judicial Council set up a task 
force to review issues relating to the competing goals of efficiency 
and access to justice in California’s family courts.22 
 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. at 163–64. 
 14 Id. at 165. 
 15 The intermediate appellate court summarily denied Mr. Elkins’ petition for a writ 
of mandate or prohibition. Id. 
 16 Id. at 169, 170.  Thus, the court was able to avoid ruling on Mr. Elkins’ claims that 
the local rules violated his constitutional rights to due process of law. Id. at 170 (“The 
conclusion we reach also permits us to avoid the difficult question whether the local rule 
and order violate petitioner’s right to due process of law . . . .”). 
 17 Id. at 171. 
 18 Id. at 178. 
 19 Id. at 177 (“A recent statewide survey reflects a similar concern with court 
procedures that do not permit family law litigants to tell their story . . . .”).  
 20 Id. at 175–77. 
 21 Id. at 176–77 (“That a procedure is efficient and moves cases through the system 
is admirable, but even more important is for the courts to provide fair and accessible 
justice.”). 
 22 Id. at 178 n.20. 
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The Judicial Council followed the court’s recommendation, 
and established the Elkins Family Law Task Force (hereinafter 
“Elkins Task Force” or “Task Force”).23  The Task Force 
contained a broad representation of actors from within the family 
law practice community.24  It conducted its work over a period of 
two years, holding public meetings and receiving comments from 
a wide range of sources.25  Eventually, the Task Force issued a 
lengthy report, along with numerous recommendations for 
actions to be taken to improve the practice of family law in 
California.26  Many of the Task Force’s recommendations were 
subsequently enacted into law as part of the legislative changes 
discussed above including the preference for live testimony in 
family law hearings and the changes to the role of minor’s 
counsel in child custody proceedings.27  The legislative changes 
relating to child testimony in custody cases did not result from 
recommendations made by the Task Force, though those changes 
were enacted around the same time as the Task Force’s 
recommendations were enacted.28 
Of course, only time will tell if the aforementioned legislative 
changes will be emulated around the country as other 
innovations in California family law have been, and whether they 
will usher in a broad pendulum swing in family law back in the 
direction of traditional modes of adversary litigation.  Regardless, 
there are reasons to be skeptical of the wisdom of the legislative 
changes under discussion here.  These reasons relate to both the 
process engaged in to arrive at the Elkins Task Force’s 
recommendations and the substance of the three legislative 
changes discussed here. 
First, the Task Force’s recommendations and the subsequent 
legislation seem to be overreactions to one particularly bad trial 
court decision.  Second, the Task Force took what I describe as a 
“consumerist” approach to the fact-finding and investigation that 
preceded its issuance of its recommendations.  The Task Force 
 
 23 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., THE ELKINS FAMILY 
LAW TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 (2010), available at 
http://www.courts.ca.gov/xbcr/cc/elkins-executive.pdf. 
 24 Id. (“The 38-member task force included appellate court justices, judges, court 
commissioners, private attorneys, legal aid attorneys, family law facilitators, self-help-
center attorneys, court executives, family court managers, family court child custody 
mediators, court administrators, and legislative staff.”). 
 25 Id. at 2. 
 26 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, THE ELKINS FAMILY LAW TASK FORCE: FINAL 
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2010), available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/xbcr/cc/ 
elkins-finalreport.pdf [hereinafter ELKINS FINAL REPORT]. 
 27 See supra note 4.  
 28 Ciaran McEvoy, Family Law System Reformed, DAILY JOURNAL, Oct. 29, 2010, 
http://www.fmbklaw.com/10daily_journal_family_law.pdf. 
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surveyed the opinions of a wide range of the users of family court 
services including lawyers, judges, litigants, and court 
personnel.29  The Task Force then took great pains to make its 
recommendations responsive to the opinions expressed.  There is 
definitely something laudable about the efforts of a government 
entity to be responsive to expressed views of its constituents in 
policy-making activities.  However, the Task Force may have 
taken this notion of “customer satisfaction” a bit too far.  Indeed, 
there are perspectives other than those of the consumers of court 
services that are worthy of consideration in any court reform 
effort.  In particular, the Task Force seemed to make no effort to 
engage academic or other scholarly perspectives that might have 
been valuable to consider in making its recommendations.  Had 
the Task Force considered these perspectives, it would have 
encountered a voluminous literature that demonstrates the 
ineffectiveness of, and indeed the harms caused by traditional 
adversary litigation methods of dispute resolution in family law 
disputes, particularly those involving issues of child custody.30 
Perhaps the Task Force’s lack of consideration of academic or 
scholarly writings regarding effective dispute resolution 
procedures in part led to what I consider to be the substantive 
failings of the recent legislative changes.  For example, the move 
toward increased use of live testimony in family law hearings 
will do nothing to improve the accuracy and reliability of child 
custody decision making, while at the same time unleashing the 
harms associated with contested custody litigation, as 
demonstrated by the literature mentioned above.  Further, the 
move toward live testimony in family court hearings seems 
inconsistent with caseload and budgetary realities that must be 
considered in conjunction with any movement toward family 
court reform.  This article contends that the Elkins Task Force’s 
move toward live testimony is ill advised in light of the Task 
Force’s failure to confront these issues. 
One of the main forces driving the legislation’s return to live 
testimony is the virtual explosion in the number of litigants 
representing themselves in family court.31  The Elkins Task 
 
 29 See ELKINS FINAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 11. 
 30 See supra notes 6–8 and accompanying text. 
 31 See Steven K. Berenson, A Family Law Residency Program?: A Modest Proposal in 
Response to the Burdens Created by Self-Represented Litigants in Family Court, 33 
RUTGERS L.J. 105, 105, 110 (2001) [hereinafter Berenson, Family Law] (“[T]he percentage 
of cases in which one or both of the parties appears without a lawyer is significantly 
higher in family law cases than in any other area of the law.”); Leslie Feitz, Comment, Pro 
Se Litigants in Domestic Relations Cases, 21 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 193, 194 
(2008) (“[D]epending on the type of proceeding, studies show that in between fifty-five and 
eighty percent of domestic relation matters, at least one party appears pro se.”); Jona 
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Force and the California Legislature seem convinced that self-
represented litigants will encounter the same difficulties that 
Mr. Elkins did in complying with local rules similar to those that 
were in issue in that case, and will be better able to present their 
cases through live testimony than under the time-saving 
procedures adopted by Contra Costa County and other California 
courts.  Certainly, though courts have adopted many innovations 
to address the challenges created by self-represented litigants, 
more work needs to be done to provide adequate access to justice 
for such litigants.32  Nonetheless, this article contends that it is 
misguided to believe that self-represented litigants will be more 
successful as trial practitioners than they are in pre-trial 
practice.  Moreover, the move to live testimony, at least in the 
case of self-represented litigants, will place judges and other 
court personnel in unfamiliar and uncomfortable positions, which 
may limit the effectiveness of the move in increasing access to 
justice.33 
This article also questions the legislative changes regarding 
the role of minor’s counsel in custody cases.  There is a long-
standing and unresolved debate regarding whether or not 
children should be represented in custody proceedings,34 and if 
 
Goldschmidt, The Pro Se Litigant’s Struggle for Access to Justice: Meeting the Challenge of 
Bench and Bar Resistance, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 36, 36 (2002) (“The surge in pro se litigation, 
particularly in the family courts of every common law country, is reported in official 
reports and anecdotally by judges and court managers and in systematic studies.”). 
 32 See, e.g., Steven Berenson, Homeless Veterans and Child Support, 45 FAM. L.Q. 
173, 180–81 (2011). 
 33 But cf. Paris R. Baldacci, Assuring Access to Justice: The Role of the Judge in 
Assisting Pro Se Litigants in Litigating Their Cases in New York City’s Housing Court, 3 
CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 659, 661–62 (2006) (explaining that court rules and 
policies, which systematically silence pro se litigants in New York City’s Housing Court, 
impede their ability to receive a fair trial); Russell Engler, And Justice for All—Including 
the Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the Roles of the Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1987, 2028–31 (1999) (arguing that judges must be as active as 
necessary to ensure that self-represented litigants receive a fair trial because “[i]f the 
courts hold out the promise of fairness and justice, but claim for practical reasons to be 
unable to achieve such a result, the advertising is false”); Goldschmidt, supra note 31, at 
53 (advocating for an expansion of judges’ roles in pro se litigation in order to improve 
access to justice). 
 34 Compare MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 164 
(2005) (arguing that appointing counsel for the child in custody cases is misguided most of 
the time), with Linda Elrod, Counsel for the Child in Custody Disputes: The Time is Now, 
26 FAM. L.Q. 53, 69 (1992) [hereinafter Elrod, Counsel for the Child] (concluding that 
children need “court-appointed counsel” and that it is time “to give children a voice in the 
legal determinations that so substantially affect their physical and mental well-being”).  
By contrast, there is a broad consensus that children should be represented in juvenile 
court matters, such as delinquency proceedings, where the U.S. Supreme Court has 
recognized a right on the part of the child to be represented by counsel. See In re Gault, 
387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967).  There is also a broad consensus that children should be 
represented in dependency matters, where abuse or neglect of the child is alleged.  See, 
e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 5106(a)(b)(2)(A)(xiii) (2006) (requiring the appointment of a Guardian Ad 
Litem in child protection cases).  The focus of this article is exclusively on the question of 
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they are represented, what form that representation should 
take.35  The traditional approaches are to provide a Guardian Ad 
Litem (GAL) for the child, an attorney to represent the child 
(minor’s counsel), or both.36  If minor’s counsel is appointed, that 
attorney might be charged with advancing the best interests of 
the child, or with advancing the child’s expressed preference as to 
the outcome of the custody dispute.37  Prior California law did not 
provide for the appointment of a GAL in custody proceedings.38  
However, California law did provide for appointment of minor’s 
counsel,39 and set forth a role for minor’s counsel that was quite 
similar to that of a GAL as traditionally understood.40  For 
example, minor’s counsel might be required to submit a 
statement of issues and contentions that was essentially the 
same as a report traditionally submitted by a GAL to the court.41  
Further, minor’s counsel was charged with representing the best 
interests of the child.42 
A consensus has developed among academic commentators 
both that it is inappropriate for minor’s counsel to play the 
neutral role of a GAL,43 and that best interests representation is 
incompatible with attorneys’ proper professional role and the 
autonomy interests of children.44  The Elkins legislation satisfies 
one of these critiques, by modifying the role of minor’s counsel to 
more closely resemble that of an attorney representing an adult 
client than that of a GAL.45  However, the relevant statutes, as 
 
representation in custody cases in family court.   
 35 See Elrod, Counsel for the Child, supra note 34, at 57 (discussing the confusion 
over the roles for attorneys in representing children). 
 36 Linda D. Elrod, Client-Directed Lawyers for Children: It Is the “Right” Thing to 
Do, 27 PACE L. REV. 869, 907–09 (2007) [hereinafter Elrod, Client-Directed Lawyers]. 
 37 Id. at 910. 
 38 See In re Marriage of Lloyd, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 37, 41 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997). 
 39 CAL. FAM. CODE § 3150 (West 2004), amended by Stats. 2010 ch. 352 § 14 (AB 939) 
(effective Jan. 1, 2011). 
 40 See Elrod, Client-Directed Lawyers, supra note 36, at 907–08 (“[A] guardian ad 
litem . . . advocates for the best interests of the child by conducting an investigation, 
writing reports or otherwise making recommendations . . . .”). 
 41 FAM. § 3151(b), amended by Stats. 2010 ch. 352 § 15 (AB 939) (effective Jan. 1, 
2011); Amy Pellman, Robert Jacobs & Dara K. Reiner, A Child-Centered Response to the 
Elkins Family Law Task Force, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 81, 115–16 (2011) 
[hereinafter Pellman, A Child-Centered Response]. 
 42 FAM. § 3151(a). 
 43 See, e.g., ABA, STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYERS REPRESENTING CHILDREN 
IN CUSTODY CASES § III(b) (2003), reprinted in 37 FAM. L.Q. 131, 131–60 (stating that a 
lawyer for a child should not testify, file a report, or make a recommendation as to 
custody); Elrod, Client-Directed Lawyers, supra note 36, at  908–10. 
 44 See, e.g., Barbara A. Atwood, Representing Children Who Can’t or Won’t Direct 
Counsel: Best Interests Lawyering or No Lawyer at All?, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 381, 382 & n.1 
[hereinafter Atwood, Best Interests] (citing numerous articles); Elrod, Client-Directed 
Lawyers, supra note 36, at 910–12. 
 45 FAM. § 3151(b) (West 2011) (eliminating authority of the court to require minor’s 
counsel to prepare a statement of issues and contentions, and prohibiting minor’s counsel 
Do Not Delete 2/1/2012 2:10 PM 
450 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 15:3 
modified, still retain best interests representation by minor’s 
counsel.46  The result is something of an incoherent or at least 
conflicted role for minor’s counsel in California that also fails to 
account adequately for the autonomy interests of older children.  
Further, it is argued here that something important is lost in 
depriving courts of the neutral and reliable information that 
formerly came in the form of minor’s counsels’ statements of 
issues and contentions.  This article takes the position that a 
better solution for the Elkins legislation to have taken would 
have been to recognize expressly a GAL role in custody cases, and 
further, to modify minor’s counsels’ role to abandon best interests 
representation for children old enough to express a mature 
preference as to the outcome of the custody case.  The interests of 
younger children would be protected adequately by a GAL 
appointment, or a GAL appointment along with a minor’s counsel 
appointed to represent the child. 
Lastly, this article also questions the legislation increasing 
the use of child testimony in custody cases.47  There is an 
overwhelming consensus among child psychologists that heavy 
involvement by children in their parents’ custody disputes puts 
the children at serious risk of psychological harm.48  Yet there is 
no activity that puts children squarely in the cross-hairs of their 
parents’ dispute to the degree that testifying in open court, and 
being subject to cross-examination does.  Prior law gave judges 
ample authority to allow children to testify in court, when it was 
necessary and important to do so.49  However, prior law’s 
preference for using alternative means to take children’s views 
into account in custody cases was more in line with children’s 
best psychological interests than the amended statute’s move 
toward child testimony.  Indeed, this change, along with the 
previously mentioned changes that will increase the adversarial 
aspect of child custody proceedings, will serve primarily to 
exacerbate the necessary harm caused to children by being the 
subject of contested custody proceedings. 
 
from testifying as a witness in custody proceedings); Pellman, A Child-Centered Response, 
supra note 41, at 115–16. 
 46 FAM. § 3151(a). 
 47 Pellman, A Child-Centered Response, supra note 41, at 115. 
 48 See, e.g., ROBERT E. EMERY, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND CHILDREN’S ADJUSTMENT 20 
(2d ed. 1999) [hereinafter EMERY, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE] (“Many negative consequences of 
divorce for children in the United States today could be avoided if family, social, and 
economic disruptions could be minimized.”). 
 49 See FAM. § 3042 (West 2004), amended by Stats. 2010 ch. 187 § 1 (AB 1050) 
(effective Jan. 1, 2012). 
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The article proceeds as follows.  First, the article engages in 
a more detailed description of the Elkins case and decision.50  
Next, the article describes the work of the Elkins Task Force,51 
and the legislation that followed the Task Force’s Report.52  The 
article then engages in a critique of the Elkins family law 
changes.53  It begins at a general level,54 first characterizing the 
changes as an overreaction to one particularly bad judicial 
decision,55 second, questioning the process utilized by the Task 
Force to arrive at its recommendations,56 and third, questioning 
the legislation’s turn away from the trend against adversary 
litigation as the primary means of resolving family law 
disputes.57  The article then proceeds to offer a more specific 
critique of the three aspects of the recent California family law 
changes that are the focus here,58 the preference for live 
testimony in family law hearings,59 the revisions to the role of 
minor’s counsel in custody cases,60 and the increased likelihood of 
child testimony in custody disputes.61  The article concludes by 
offering a revised set of recommendations that would accomplish 
many of the goals set forth by the Elkins Task Force, but without 
imposing the negative consequences of the changes that have 
actually been adopted.62   
I.  THE ELKINS DECISION 
Marilyn Elkins filed for dissolution of her more than two-
decade marriage to Jeffrey Elkins.63  The financial issues were 
scheduled to be tried on September 19, 2005.64  Pursuant to a 
local rule of the Contra Costa County (California) Superior Court, 
the matter was to be decided based upon “the pleadings 
submitted by the parties without live testimony.”65  The rule 
further provided that “direct examination on factual matters 
 
 50 See infra Part I. 
 51 See infra Part II. 
 52 See infra Part III. 
 53 See infra Part IV. 
 54 See infra Part IV(A). 
 55 See infra Part IV(A)(i). 
 56 See infra Part IV(A)(ii). 
 57 See infra Part IV(A)(iii). 
 58 See infra Part IV(B). 
 59 See infra Part IV(B)(i). 
 60 See infra Part IV(B)(ii). 
 61 See infra Part IV(B)(iii). 
 62 See infra Part V. 
 63 Respondent’s Return by Answer to Petition for Writ of Mandate or Prohibition at 
11 Elkins v. Superior Court, 163 P.3d 160 (Cal. 2007) (No. S139073), 2006 WL 1267810.  
The parties were married in 1980 and separated in 2001. Id. 
 64 Elkins, 163 P.3d at 162. 
 65 Id. at 163 (quoting SUP. CT. CONTRA COSTA CNTY. R. 12.5(b)(3) (effective July 1, 
2005) (repealed 2008)).  
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shall not be permitted except in unusual circumstances or for 
proper rebuttal.”66  The parties’ declarations would be admitted 
in evidence at the hearing, “subject to legal objection, 
amendment, and cross-examination . . . .”67  A local trial 
scheduling order (TSO) further restricted the parties’ ability to 
submit evidence at the hearing.68  The TSO reiterated that direct 
testimony would be presented at trial in the form of declarations 
submitted prior to trial “in lieu of oral direct testimony, subject to 
cross-examination.”69  Declarations from the parties and their 
witnesses were required to be filed ten court days prior to trial, 
along with trial briefs.70  The TSO further provided that all trial 
exhibits needed to be appended to the declarations and that the 
evidentiary basis for the admissibility of the exhibits needed to 
be set forth in the declarations as well.71 
Marilyn was represented by counsel for purposes of the 
hearing, but Jeffrey was not.72  Both parties submitted their trial 
briefs and declarations on September 2, 2005.73  Jeffrey, however, 
did not attach his exhibits to his declaration as required by the 
TSO, but rather delivered a binder with thirty-six exhibits to the 
court and opposing counsel one court day prior to the hearing.74  
Marilyn filed a responsive declaration on September 8, 2005.75  
At the hearing, Marilyn’s attorney objected to the introduction of 
all but two of Jeffrey’s exhibits on grounds that only those two 
exhibits were described in his declaration as required by the 
TSO.76  The court ultimately sustained counsel’s objection to the 
introduction of the exhibits.77  After a lengthy colloquy with the 
court regarding its reasons for disallowing the exhibits, Jeffrey 
also declined to offer his declaration in evidence.78  With no 
evidence from Jeffrey to consider, the matter proceeded “quasi by 
default, so to speak,” in the words of the trial judge.79  Though 
 
 66 Id. (quoting SUP. CT. CONTRA COSTA CNTY. R. 12.5(b)(3) (effective July 1, 2005) 
(repealed 2008)). 
 67 Id. (quoting SUP. CT. CONTRA COSTA CNTY. R. 12.5(b)(3) (effective July 1, 2005) 
(repealed 2008)). 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id.  The TSO required these documents to be filed ten court days before the 
hearing. Id.   
 74 Id. 
 75 Id.  The TSO required responsive declarations and exhibits to be filed five court 
days before the hearing. Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. at 164.  The TSO did provide that “[f]ailure to comply with [its] requirements 
will constitute good cause to exclude evidence or testimony at trial . . . .” Id. at 163.   
 78 Id. at 164. 
 79 Id. 
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the judge awarded Jeffrey an interest in the marital home and in 
Marilyn’s pension, the court resolved the other property issues in 
a manner substantially in conformity with the proposed order 
submitted by Marilyn’s counsel.80  
Jeffrey appealed the judgment of the trial court, arguing that 
there was no statutory authority for the local requirements 
preventing direct testimony at the hearing, requiring 
declarations to be filed, and requiring the evidentiary foundation 
for trial exhibits to be set forth in the declarations.81  He also 
contended that the system of “trial by declaration” deprived him 
of his due process right to a hearing on the merits of his claim, 
and that the sanctions available for violation of the local rule and 
TSO were inconsistent with policies favoring resolution on the 
merits of disputes.82  California’s intermediate appellate court 
summarily denied Jeffrey’s petition.83  However, the California 
Supreme Court granted Jeffrey’s petition for review, and ordered 
the Contra Costa County Superior Court to show cause why the 
local rule and order should not be deemed invalid for the reasons 
argued by Jeffrey before the intermediate appellate court.84 
The California Supreme Court noted that while “some 
informality and flexibility have been accepted in marital 
dissolution proceedings,” the same statutory rules of evidence 
and procedure that govern other civil matters remain applicable 
in the family court.85  Additionally, declarations of the sort 
required by Contra Costa County are hearsay, and therefore are 
inadmissible at trial, unless an exception to the hearsay rule 
provides for their admission.86  One such exception appears in 
section 2009 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, which 
provides for the admissibility of affidavits or declarations in 
motion proceedings.87  However, the court made clear that section 
2009 did not support the Contra Costa County rule because that 
rule applied at trial, rather than in motion proceedings.88 
 
 80 Id. at 165. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. at 167–68. 
 86 Id. at 168. 
 87 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2009 (West 2007) (“An affidavit may be used to verify a 
pleading or a paper in a special proceeding, to prove the service of a summons, notice, or 
other paper in an action or special proceeding, to obtain a provisional remedy, the 
examination of a witness, or a stay of proceedings, and in uncontested proceedings to 
establish a record of birth, or upon a motion, and in any other case expressly permitted by 
statute.”); see also Elkins, 163 P.3d at 168. 
 88 Elkins, 163 P.3d at 168. 
Do Not Delete 2/1/2012 2:10 PM 
454 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 15:3 
The court went on to discuss the policy in favor of the 
admissibility of all relevant evidence, that evidence relating to 
the credibility of other evidence falls within the scope of such 
relevant evidence, and that live testimony may be particularly 
important to determining the credibility of witnesses and other 
evidence presented in marital dissolution and other trials.89  The 
court offered numerous examples of statutory and case law 
support for this proposition, and therefore was able to conclude 
that the lower court’s rules contravened these authorities and 
were invalid, without having to reach Jeffrey’s due process 
arguments.90 
The primary justification offered by the County in support of 
its rules focused on “efficiency” and the desire to provide for the 
“expeditious resolution of family law cases . . . .”91  The California 
Supreme Court praised the County’s desire to provide efficient 
procedures and to move cases quickly through the system.92  It 
also acknowledged the particularly heavy volume of marital 
dissolution cases required to be handled by superior courts, and 
the additional challenges presented by the fact that such a high 
percentage of litigants in such cases appear without counsel.93  
Nonetheless, the court concluded that these interests cannot 
trump the rights of litigants to “fair and accessible justice.”94  
Given that trial courts all around the state face similar 
challenges to those faced by Contra Costa County, and many 
courts have adopted similar rules and procedures to those that 
the high court struck down as impermissible, the court concluded 
by recommending to the Judicial Council95 that 
 
 89 Id. at 170. 
 90 Id. at 169–70. 
 91 Id. at 175. 
 92 Id. at 176. 
 93 Id. at 177. 
 94 Id. at 176. 
 95 Created by a state constitutional amendment in 1926, the California Judicial 
Council is the governing body of California’s judicial branch, administering the extremely 
large California Court system. See Ronald M. George, Brennan Lecture: Challenges 
Facing an Independent Judiciary, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1345, 1353 & n.24 (2005); ADMIN. 
OFFICE OF THE COURTS, PROFILE: JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA 1 (4th ed. 2006), 
available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/xbcr/cc/profilejc.pdf.  According to article VI of the 
California Constitution: 
The Judicial Council consists of the Chief Justice and one other judge of the 
Supreme Court, three judges of courts of appeal, 10 judges of superior courts, 
two nonvoting court administrators, and any other nonvoting members as 
determined by the voting membership of the council, each appointed by the 
Chief Justice for a three-year term pursuant to procedures established by the 
council; four members of the State Bar appointed by its governing body for 
three-year terms; and one member of each house of the Legislature appointed 
as provided by the house. 
CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6(a). 
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it establish a task force, including representatives of the family law 
bench and bar and the Judicial Council Advisory Committee on 
Family and Juvenile Law, to study and propose measures to assist 
trial courts in achieving efficiency and fairness in marital dissolution 
proceedings and to ensure access to justice for litigants, many of 
whom are self-represented.  Such a task force might wish to consider 
proposals for adoption of new rules of court establishing statewide 
rules of practice and procedure for fair and expeditious proceedings in 
family law, from the initiation of an action to postjudgment motions.  
Special care might be taken to accommodate self-represented 
litigants.  Proposed rules could be written in a manner easy for 
laypersons to follow, be economical to comply with, and ensure that a 
litigant be afforded a satisfactory opportunity to present his or her 
case to the court.96 
II.  THE ELKINS FAMILY LAW TASK FORCE 
Pursuant to the recommendation of the California Supreme 
Court, the Judicial Council appointed the Elkins Family Law 
Task Force in 2008.97  The Task Force consisted of thirty-eight 
members, including “appellate court justices, judges, court 
commissioners, private attorneys, legal aid attorneys, family law 
facilitators, self-help-center attorneys, court executives, family 
court managers, family court child custody mediators, court 
administrators, and legislative staff.”98  The Task Force worked 
for nearly two years in formulating its recommendations.99  It 
sought input from a variety of sources including: focus groups 
with court users, attorneys, judicial officers and court staff; 
comments at public meetings and one public hearing; and 
numerous e-mail and print letters commenting on the work of the 
commission.100  The Task Force also conducted a survey of 
attorneys, and reviewed available court data.101  In September 
2009 the Task Force released a set of draft recommendations.102  
The Task Force then held additional public hearings and sought 
additional input regarding the draft recommendations before 
finalizing its recommendations in an April 2010 report.103 
The Task Force made recommendations in five broad areas.  
These areas were: (1) efficient and effective procedures to help 
 
 96 Elkins, 163 P.3d at 178 n.20. 
 97 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, THE ELKINS FAMILY LAW TASK FORCE FINAL 
REPORT: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 (2010), available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/xbcr/cc/ 
elkins-executive.pdf. 
 98 Id. 
 99 ELKINS FINAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 11. 
 100 Id. 
 101 See Laurie Zelon, The Elkins Task Force: Meeting the Challenges of Family Law in 
California’s Courts, 1 CAL. L. REV. CIR. 25, 27 (2010). 
 102 ELKINS FINAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 14. 
 103 Id. 
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ensure justice, fairness, due process and safety;104 (2) more 
effective child custody procedures;105 (3) ensuring meaningful 
access to justice for all litigants;106 (4) enhancing the status of, 
and respect for, family law litigants and processes;107 and (5) 
laying the foundation for future innovation.108  In total, the Task 
Force offered 117 separate recommendations.109  Naturally, 
discussing each of the recommendations goes well beyond the 
scope of the present analysis.  Moreover, many of the 
recommendations are laudable.  For example, the report 
recommends: the adoption of caseflow management procedures 
for family law cases similar to those that have been successfully 
implemented regarding other civil cases;110 better information for 
litigants regarding court processes and procedures;111 providing 
increased assistance to those who seek to settle their family law 
disputes;112 simplification of mandatory court forms;113 greater 
availability of interpreters for those who do not speak English 
adequately to participate effectively in court proceedings;114 and 
greater accessibility of court facilities for persons with 
disabilities.115  Thus, the focus here will be on the task force’s 
more controversial recommendations.  These include a 
presumption in favor of live testimony at all family law 
hearings116 and a new definition of the role of minors’ counsel to 
more closely approximate the traditional understanding of an 
attorney representing a client.117  Further, those 
recommendations that subsequently led to legislative changes 
are the most significant for purposes of the present analysis. 
III.  THE ELKINS FAMILY LAW LEGISLATION 
Unlike many “blue-ribbon” task forces whose 
recommendations quickly end up in the dust-bin of policy 
analysis,118 the Elkins Task Force’s recommendations led quickly 
 
 104 Id. at 19. 
 105 Id. at 44. 
 106 Id. at 58. 
 107 Id. at 74. 
 108 Id. at 88. 
 109 Pellman, A Child-Centered Response, supra note 41, at 83. 
 110 ELKINS FINAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 21. 
 111 Id. at 23. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. at 33–36. 
 114 Id. at 69. 
 115 Id. at 73. 
 116 Id. at 29. 
 117 Id. at 53–54. 
 118 For example, in 2010, President Obama created the National Commission on 
Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, also known as the Simpson-Bowles Commission, after 
its co-chairmen, former Senator Alan Simpson (Republican) and former White House 
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to significant legislative changes to California family law.  The 
two major pieces of legislation were California Assembly Bills 
939 and 1050.119  The highlights of this legislation will be 
addressed below. 
First and foremost, California Assembly Bill 939 added to 
the California Family Code section 217, which provides that: 
(a) At a hearing on any order to show cause or notice of motion 
brought pursuant to this code, absent a stipulation of the parties or a 
finding of good cause pursuant to subdivision (b), the court shall 
receive any live, competent testimony that is relevant and within the 
scope of the hearing and the court may ask questions of the parties. 
(b) In appropriate cases, a court may make a finding of good cause to 
refuse to receive live testimony and shall state its reasons for the 
finding on the record or in writing.  The Judicial Council shall, by 
January 1, 2012, adopt a statewide rule of court regarding the factors 
a court shall consider in making a finding of good cause.[120] 
(c) A party seeking to present live testimony from witnesses other 
than the parties shall, prior to the hearing, file and serve a witness 
list with a brief description of the anticipated testimony.  If the 
witness list is not served prior to the hearing, the court may, on 
request, grant a brief continuance and may make appropriate 
temporary orders pending the continued hearing.121 
 
Chief-of-Staff Erskine Bowles (Democrat).  See About the National Commission on Fiscal 
Responsibility and Reform, NAT’L COMM’N ON FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY AND REFORM, 
www.fiscalcommission.gov/about (last visited Nov. 30, 2011).  The Commission was 
charged with “identifying policies to improve the fiscal situation in the medium term and 
to achieve fiscal sustainability over the long run.” Id.  Despite issuing a very well received 
report, the Commission’s recommendations have not been implemented.  See Op-Ed, Let’s 
Take Another Look at Simpson-Bowles, HOUS. CHRON., Nov. 16, 2011, 
http://www.chron.com/opinion/editorials/article/Let-s-take-another-look-at-Simpson-
Bowles-2273167.php; Thomas Friedman, Op-Ed, Go Big, Mr. Obama, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 
2011, at A31. 
 119 Pellman, A Child-Centered Response, supra note 41, at 83. 
 120 The factors set forth in Rule 5.119(b) of the California Rules of Court are: 
1) [w]hether a substantive matter is at issue—such as child custody, parenting 
time (visitation), parentage, child support, spousal support, requests for 
restraining orders, or the characterization, division, or temporary use and 
control of the property or debt of the parties; 
2) [w]hether material facts are in controversy; 
3) [w]hether live testimony is necessary  for the court to assess the credibility 
of parties or other witnesses; 
4) [t]he right of the parties to question anyone submitting reports or other 
information to the court; 
5) [i]n testimony from persons other than the parties, whether there has been 
compliance with Family Code section 217(c); and 
6) [a]ny other factor that is just and equitable. 
CAL. R. CT. 5.119(b). 
 121 CAL. FAM. CODE § 217 (West 2011) (emphasis added).   
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Assembly Bill 939 also contained a number of provisions 
relating to the award of attorney’s fees in family law cases.122  
The Bill also had provisions expanding the availability of the 
summary dissolution process.123  Further, it redefined the role of 
minor’s counsel in contested custody cases to more closely 
approximate the traditional understanding of the role of an 
attorney representing a client in litigation.124  Thus, minor’s 
counsel is restricted to presenting admissible evidence to the 
court, in the form of “notices and pleadings . . . consistent with 
requirements for parties.”125  Minor’s counsel is not to testify as a 
witness in the proceedings.126  Minor’s counsel is required to 
present the child’s wishes to the court if the child so desires.127  
“Counsel may introduce and examine counsel’s own witnesses, 
present arguments to the court concerning the child’s welfare, 
and participate further in the proceeding to the degree necessary 
to represent the child adequately.”128 
Under California law, mediation is mandatory in child 
custody disputes.129  Moreover, at the election of each county, the 
county may allow the family court mediator to make a 
recommendation to the court regarding the custody dispute.130  
Under the Elkins legislation, in counties that have opted for this 
evaluative mediation, the family court services mediator will now 
be known as the “child custody recommending counselor.”131   
The other major piece of family law legislation enacted 
following the Elkins Task Force Report was Assembly Bill 
1050.132  However, AB 1050 was not the result of 
recommendations made by the task force.  Still, consistent with 
the Elkins changes, AB 1050 expands the role of child testimony 
in custody disputes.133  Thus, AB 1050 amends existing 
California family law to require judges to allow a child, age 
fourteen or higher, to address the court on the issues of custody 
and visitation, unless the court determines that doing so would 
not be in the child’s best interests.134  Moreover, the revised 
statute further states that nothing in the law “shall be 
 
 122 Assemb. B. 939, 2009–2010 Assemb., Reg. Sess., §§ 4–6, 13, 17 (Cal. 2010). 
 123 Assemb. B. 939, §§ 8–9. 
 124 Assemb. B. 939, § 15. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. 
 129 CAL. FAM. CODE § 3170(a) (West 2011). 
 130 FAM. § 3183. 
 131 2010 Cal. Legis. Serv. 1916, 1924 (West) (to be codified at FAM. § 3183). 
 132 Assemb. B. 1050, 2009–2010 Assemb., Reg. Sess., (Cal. 2010). 
 133 Assemb. B. 1050 § 1. 
 134 Assemb. B. 1050, § 1 (enacted at FAM. § 3042 (West 2011)). 
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interpreted to prevent a child who is less than 14 years of age 
from addressing the court regarding custody or visitation . . . .”135 
IV. WHY MANY OF THE ELKINS FAMILY LAW CHANGES  
ARE MISGUIDED 
This part of the article outlines some of the many reasons 
why the Elkins family law changes under consideration here are 
misguided.  It first addresses some general criticisms of the 
changes, then the three specific statutory changes that are the 
focus here. 
A. General Criticisms of the Elkins Family Law Changes 
There are at least three general criticisms of the Elkins 
family law changes.  First, they represent an overreaction to a 
particularly bad decision in a single case.  Second, the 
information gathering processes relied upon by the Elkins Task 
Force in making its recommendations were lacking in important 
respects.  Third, the changes make an ill-advised reversal of 
course from the strong trend in family law in recent decades 
away from adversary litigation. 
i.  Bad Decisions Make Bad Law 
One of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’ famous aphorisms is 
that hard cases make bad law.136  Well, bad decisions make bad 
law as well, and it is quite clear that Judge Baskin made a bad 
decision in essentially depriving Jeffrey Elkins of any meaningful 
opportunity to be heard regarding his divorce trial.137  However, 
the changes recommended by the Task Force and adopted by the 
Legislature go far beyond what would have been required to 
remedy the injustice caused in the Elkins case. 
First, as the California Supreme Court’s decision makes 
abundantly clear, the Elkins appeal involved a trial rather than a 
mere motion hearing.138  And of course, the due process 
implications of restricting testimony at the final hearing in a 
proceeding are much more significant than for doing so at a 
preliminary hearing.  Indeed, the court expressly stated that its 
decision should not be read as applying to motion hearings rather 
 
 135 FAM. § 3042(d). 
 136 See N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 137 Unfortunately, Mr. Elkins was not able to benefit from the remand ordered by the 
California Supreme Court in his case.  He died in 2008 before the case could be tried. 
Barbara Kate Repa, Reform or Wreckage, CAL. LAW., Aug. 2011, at 26, 30 [hereinafter 
Repa, Reform or Wreckage]. 
 138 Elkins v. Superior Court, 163 P.3d. 160, 168–69 (Cal. 2007). 
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than trials.139  Yet, the Task Force and subsequent legislation 
went well beyond the scope of what the court intended by 
extending the requirement for live testimony to motion hearings 
as well as to trials.  
The Task Force rightly recognized that the results of motion 
hearings in family law cases may have a greater impact on the 
outcome of proceedings than in other areas of practice.140  
Particularly where custody of a child is concerned, a court will be 
highly reluctant to disturb the results of a pendente lite motion 
where the effect will be changing the custodial arrangement of a 
minor child.141  Such disruptions can be highly detrimental to 
children, and courts’ reluctance to change custody back and forth 
between parents over the course of family law litigation makes 
sense.142  Thus, it is arguable that decisions in motion hearings in 
family court set something of a status quo that courts are 
reluctant to disturb; therefore, the importance of such pre-trial 
motions is elevated, and the drawbacks of requiring live 
testimony at such hearings are nonetheless warranted. 
However, it is clear that regardless of the import of pre-trial 
hearings in family law cases, litigants still get a final (and indeed 
their most extensive) “bite at the apple,” should they choose to 
exercise their right to a final trial on the contested custody issues 
in the case.  Preserving a right to present live testimony at such 
a final hearing would address the due process concerns the 
California Supreme Court raised in Elkins, while at the same 
time failing to unleash all of the negative consequences, 
discussed below, that will accompany increased use of live 
testimony in pre-trial motion hearings in family law cases.  Thus, 
the Task Force and the Legislature should have stopped at the 
court’s call for increased use of live testimony at trials, rather 
than greatly expanding the scope of the court’s suggestion. 
 
 139 Id. at 162 n.1. 
 140 ELKINS FINAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 27–28. 
 141 See, e.g., Janet Weinstein, And Never the Twain Shall Meet: The Best Interests of 
Children and the Adversary System, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 79, 112–13 (1997) (describing 
this phenomenon as “sequentiality”). 
 142 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473, 478–79 (Cal. 1996) (“[T]he 
paramount need for continuity and stability in custody arrangements—and the harm that 
may result from disruption of established patterns of care and emotional bonds with the 
primary caretaker—weigh heavily in favor of maintaining ongoing custody 
arrangements.”). 
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ii.  The Information Gathering Processes Used by the Elkins 
Task Force Were Flawed 
It is true that the Elkins Task Force included a broad cross-
section of judges, court personnel, and family law practitioners.143  
However, notably absent from the Task Force were any 
academics.  And while the Task Force purports to have examined 
data available from the California Administrative Office of the 
Courts regarding the practice of family law in California,144 there 
is no indication that the Task Force paid any attention 
whatsoever to the vast amount of existing scholarly research and 
literature regarding adversary justice generally and family law 
litigation in particular.  An analysis of that literature reveals a 
profound skepticism regarding the efficacy of the adversary 
processes that the Elkins legislation reintroduces into family law 
practice, and a particular concern about the damage caused to 
the participants in family law disputes from the employment of 
adversary processes to resolve such disputes.145 
Additionally, the Elkins Task Force displayed a 
“consumerist” approach to its fact-finding and analysis regarding 
the pre-existing family law dispute resolution processes.  The 
Task Force, prior to issuing its recommendations, surveyed a 
broad range of “consumers” of the services of the family law 
department during its fact-finding inquiry.146  These consumers 
included lawyers, litigants, court personnel, and judges.  
Moreover, it is clear that, in issuing its recommendations, the 
Task Force took great pains to respond to the concerns expressed 
by these consumers of its services.  Indeed, the Task  
Force’s Final Report frequently states where a particular 
recommendation is responsive to a comment or comments made 
by one of its consumers.147 
Of course it is laudatory when a government entity such as a 
court seeks to assert a high level of responsiveness to the 
constituents it exists to serve.  More government entities should 
seek to emulate the customer service orientation of the task 
force.  However, it is also possible to take this customer service 
orientation too far.  For example, the consumers of judicial 
 
 143 See ELKINS FINAL REPORT, supra note 26, at ii–iii (listing the members of the 
Elkins Task Force). 
 144 Id. at 14 n.7. 
 145 See infra notes 148–56 and accompanying text. 
 146 ELKINS FINAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 11–14. 
 147 See, e.g., ELKINS FINAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 28 (“According to the surveys 
conducted and the response of the members of the public who presented testimony to the 
task force, these limitations on the right to present live testimony and the resulting 
exclusive use of declarations are significant concerns to attorneys and the self-represented 
alike.”). 
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services are unlikely to be experts in important matters such as 
court administration and substantive family law, let alone 
broader concepts like due process.  And, as pointed out above, the 
task force seems to have paid little attention to scholarly writing, 
academic experts, or broader empirical studies regarding the 
effectiveness of various approaches to dispute resolution in 
family courts.  While the Task Force’s customer service 
orientation is commendable, that orientation would have been 
more effective coupled with the consideration of the broader 
range of important information suggested here that the task 
force should have, but failed, to consider. 
iii.  The Paradigm Shift Away from Adversary Litigation 
Over the past four decades, many family law scholars have 
concluded that traditional adversary litigation measures are 
poorly suited to resolving family law disputes, particularly those 
involving children.148  Family law disputes differ significantly 
from the typical tort, contract, and property disputes that our 
adversary system was designed to address.  Litigation involving 
most disputes in these other areas of law is “backward looking”: 
courts must determine what happened with regard to a past 
event or events, and assign blame for what went wrong.149  By 
contrast, while custody cases do involve a certain measure of fact 
finding with regard to past events, the ultimate goal of such 
proceedings is to make a prediction regarding future 
possibilities—for example, which potential custody arrangement 
will serve the best interests of the child.150  Yet adversarial 
litigation methods were not designed to predict the future, but 
rather to assess and assign a remedy regarding past events, and 
they do a poor job in making such future predictions.151 
By its very nature, the adversary system encourages 
litigants to assert extreme positions.  Indeed, one of the 
 
 148 See, e.g., Linda D. Elrod, Reforming the System to Protect Children in High 
Conflict Custody Cases, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 495, 501 (2001) [hereinafter Elrod, 
High Conflict]; Gregory Firestone & Janet Weinstein, In the Best Interests of Children: A 
Proposal To Transform the Adversarial System, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 203, 203 (2004); 
Murphy, supra note 5, at 894; Andrew Schepard, The Evolving Judicial Role in Custody 
Disputes: From Fault Finder to Conflict Manager to Differential Case Management, 22 U. 
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 395, 428 (2000) [hereinafter Schepard, Evolving Judicial Role]; 
Singer, supra note 6, at 363; Weinstein, supra note 141, at 82. 
 149 Elrod, High Conflict, supra note 148, at 501; SCHEPARD, CHILDREN, COURTS, supra 
note 6, at 3; Weinstein, supra note 141, at 98. 
 150 Elrod, High Conflict, supra note 148, at 501; SCHEPARD, CHILDREN, COURTS, supra 
note 6, at 3; Weinstein, supra note 141, at 98. 
 151 Elrod, High Conflict, supra note 148, at 501; Firestone & Weinstein, supra note 
148, at 205; Weinstein, supra note 141, at 111 (“Decisions about the best interests of the 
child rest upon an effort to predict what will occur in the future . . . [and] [c]learly, neither 
judges nor attorneys have the training to make such predictions . . . .”). 
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foundational premises of the adversary system is that truth is 
most likely to emerge from the presentation of competing and 
contrasting positions.152  The presentation of competing extremes 
is often enhanced by the zealous advocacy responsibilities of the 
parties’ lawyers.153  Naturally, this process can create additional 
friction between the parties to the dispute, who would not be 
suing one another in the first place if their relationship were not 
already strained.  However, in tort, contract, and property 
contexts, the increased friction is tolerable because, once the 
lawsuit is over and the dispute resolved, the parties go their 
separate ways.154  Yet, this is not so in most family law contexts, 
particularly not in custody litigation.  Except in unusual cases, 
both parents will continue to play a major role in their child’s life, 
and they will need to co-parent successfully, often for many years 
into the future, in order to serve the best interests of the child.  
Yet, the strains engendered by hotly contested custody litigation 
may have a highly negative impact on the parents’ ability to 
work together in future co-parenting.155 
The tendency to assert extreme positions takes place at 
every stage of the adversarial litigation process.156  In their 
pleadings, the parties advance the most extreme positions 
possible, if only to keep their options open later in the case.  
Indeed, the “all or nothing” quality of litigation judgments 
requires parties to ask for everything, or risk receiving nothing 
at the end of the case.157  In a typical custody case, parents 
exaggerate their own parenting strengths, as well as the other 
parent’s weaknesses, in an effort to enhance their position in the 
litigation.  This process of exaggeration continues at every 
further stage of the litigation process:158 in discovery events such 
as depositions, interrogatories, and document requests; in 
settlement negotiations; and, of course, reaches its apogee during 
 
 152 See, e.g., Cantrell, supra note 7, at 6; Judge Leonard Edwards (ret.), Comments on 
the Miller Commission Report: A California Perspective, 27 PACE L. REV. 627, 635 (2007) 
[hereinafter, Edwards, Comments]; Firestone & Weinstein, supra note 148, at 203. 
 153 See, e.g., Elrod, High Conflict, supra note 148, at 501; Firestone & Weinstein, 
supra note 148, at 204; Andrew Schepard, Kramer vs. Kramer Revisited: A Comment on 
The Miller Commission Report and the Obligation of Divorce Lawyers for Parents to 
Discuss Alternative Dispute Resolution with Their Clients, 27 PACE L. REV. 677, 685–86 
(2007) [hereinafter, Schepard, Kramer]; Weinstein, supra note 141, at 90–91. 
 154 Elrod, High Conflict, supra note 148, at 501. 
 155 See Firestone & Weinstein, supra note 148, at 204; Weinstein, supra note 141, at 
122. 
 156 See, e.g., Edwards, Comments, supra note 152, at 636 (describing adversarial 
tactics in an at-fault divorce proceeding). 
 157 Weinstein, supra note 141, at 87–88. 
 158 Joan B. Kelly, Psychological and Legal Interventions for Parents and Children in 
Custody and Access Disputes: Current Research and Practice, 10 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 
129, 131 (2002). 
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the contested courtroom hearing or trial.159  The likelihood of 
increased hostility between the parties at every stage of the 
process as a result of this competition is obvious.160 
Over the past four decades, psychologists and other 
researchers have developed a more sophisticated understanding 
of the impact that divorce and child custody litigation has on the 
children involved.  At the beginning of this cycle, researchers 
held the perception that in virtually all cases, divorce had a 
significantly negative psychological impact on children.161  
However, over time, psychologists have come to conclude that not 
all children suffer long-term harm as a result of divorce.162  
Indeed, the pivotal factor in determining children’s long-term 
adjustment to family dissolution relates to the amount of intra-
family conflict to which the children are exposed.163  This 
exposure can occur within the family home prior to the break-up 
of the family, or during the divorce/custody litigation, or post-
litigation as the parents struggle to co-parent the child after the 
marriage has been dissolved.164  In virtually all cases, increases 
in the amount of intra-family conflict result in increased negative 
outcomes for the children as they age.165  Thus, adversary 
litigation events that increase the amount of conflict between 
parents during the litigation process, and then have a negative 
impact on the on-going, post-dissolution relationship of the 
parents, will logically result in adverse consequences to the 
children involved. 
In recognition of these findings by both legal scholars and 
psychologists, courts have taken significant steps to modify 
traditional adversary processes in family law by moving from 
those procedures that engender conflict between the litigants to 
newer and emerging processes designed to decrease conflict 
between the litigants.  Perhaps the most widespread and best 
known of such changes is the move toward mediation of family 
 
 159 See infra Part IV(B)(i). 
 160 See Edwards, Comments, supra note 152, at 637. 
 161 See Paul R. Amato, Good Enough Marriages: Parental Discord, Divorce, and 
Children’s Long-Term Well-Being, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 71, 72 (2001); Cassandra 
Brown, Comment, Ameliorating the Effects of Divorce on Children, 22 J. AM. ACAD. 
MATRIMONIAL LAW. 461, 461 (2009); SCHEPARD, CHILDREN, COURTS, supra note 6, at 28. 
 162 Amato, supra note 161, at 71–72; Elizabeth S. Scott, Divorce, Children’s Welfare, 
and the Culture Wars, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 95, 100 (2001). 
 163 See, e.g., Brown, supra note 161, at 462; Elrod, High Conflict, supra note 148, at 
497; John H. Grych, Interparental Conflict as a Risk Factor for Child Maladjustment: 
Implications for the Development of Prevention Programs, 43 FAM. CT. REV. 97, 98 (2005); 
Kelly, supra note 158, at 129–30; Murphy, supra note 6, at 894–95; SCHEPARD, CHILDREN, 
COURTS, supra note 6, at 31; Scott, supra note 162, at 98–99; Singer, supra note 6, at 363. 
 164 Brown, supra note 161, at 462. 
 165 See Elrod, High Conflict, supra note 148, at 497.  
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law disputes, as discussed above.166  Mediation is meant to 
encourage parties to resolve their differences rather than to 
engage in protracted courtroom battles.167  Other examples of 
procedures developed in family court to reduce litigation conflict 
include: differentiated case management,168 parenting plans,169 
parent education classes,170 parenting coordinators,171 neutral 
custody evaluations,172 and collaborative law.173  A detailed 
discussion of these procedures lies well beyond the scope of the 
present article.  Though not each of these reforms has been 
adopted in every jurisdiction, the overall move toward the 
adoption of non-adversarial methods to help to resolve family law 
disputes has been widespread, national, and overwhelming in 
scope.  And, as pointed out earlier, California has been a leader 
in the adoption of such methods in many respects.174  
Certainly, the Elkins changes represent a 180-degree turn 
from this long-standing trend away from adversarial litigation 
methods in family law cases.  As the Elkins Task Force pointed 
out, in many courts the presentation of live testimony had 
become the exception, rather than the rule, in contested family 
law proceedings, particularly in motion proceedings rather than 
trials.175  Yet, as will be discussed in greater detail below, the 
presentation of live testimony through witnesses in court 
represents the most adversarial of all possible litigation 
activities.176  The legislation also redefines the role of minor’s 
counsel more along the lines of the traditional adversarial 
attorney, rather than the guardian ad litem-like role minor’s 
 
 166 See supra notes 129–31 and accompanying text. 
 167 See Elrod, High Conflict, supra note 148, at 527 & n.124; Schepard, Kramer, supra 
note 153, at 682 (discussing benefits of mediation in custody disputes); Nancy Ver Steegh, 
Family Court Reform and ADR: Shifting Values and Expectations Transform the Divorce 
Process, 42 FAM. L.Q. 659, 662 (2008). 
 168 Elrod, High Conflict, supra note 148, at 521–22; Ver Steegh, supra note 167, at 
668–69. 
 169 Elrod, High Conflict, supra note 148, at 529–30. 
 170 Grych, supra note 163, at 103; Shelley Kierstead, Parent Education Programs in 
Family Courts: Balancing Autonomy and State Intervention, 49 FAM. CT. REV. 140, 140 
(2011); Susan L. Pollet & Melissa Lombreglia, A Nationwide Survey of Mandatory Parent 
Education, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 375, 375 (2008). 
 171 See Brown, supra note 161, at 477–78; Elrod, High Conflict, supra note 148, at 
533; Joi T. Montiel, Why and How Alabama Courts Should Use Parenting Coordination in 
Divorce Cases, 72 ALA. LAW. 300, 301 (2011); Ver Steegh, supra note 167, at 663–64. 
 172 Mary Kay Kisthardt & Barbara Glesner Fines, Making a Place at the Table: 
Reconceptualizing the Role of the Custody Evaluator in Child Custody Disputes, 43 FAM. 
CT. REV. 229, 229–30 (2005); Ver Steegh, supra note 167, at 663.  
 173 See Brown, supra note 161, at 479–80; Ver Steegh, supra note 167, at 667–68. 
 174 SCHEPARD, CHILDREN, COURTS, supra note 6, at 83–84 (comparing the dissolution 
process in New York with that of California); Schepard, Evolving Judicial Role, supra 
note 148, at 397–98. 
 175 ELKINS FINAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 27. 
 176 See infra Part IV(B)(i). 
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counsel had come to play in family law cases in California.177  
This too will have the effect of increasing the adversarial nature 
of custody litigation.  Finally, the legislative changes making it 
more likely that children will testify or otherwise play an active 
role in family law litigation will also serve to further increase the 
adversarial quality of such proceedings.178 
To be sure, the Elkins legislation does not represent a 
wholesale abandonment of collaborative procedures in California 
family law practice.  After all, California was the first state to 
mandate mediation in child custody disputes,179 and such 
mediation remains required under California law.  However, 
some of the Elkins changes do suggest that California’s 
commitment to non-adversary procedures is less steadfast than 
its first-to-mandate mediation status would appear to indicate.  
From early on, California counties have had the option to decide 
whether, in the event the parties are not able to reach an 
agreement as to the custody issues in their case, the mediator 
should make a recommendation to the court as to how the 
custody dispute should be resolved.180  This practice has long 
been criticized by mediation scholars as violating some of the 
fundamental principles of mediation including confidentiality 
and neutrality.181  Indeed, many would consider a “mediator’s 
recommendation” to be an oxymoron. 
While this author shares the criticisms of the manner in 
which mediation is conducted in “recommending” counties, those 
arguments have been fully aired elsewhere, and will not be 
repeated here.182  The Elkins Task Force noted, but sidestepped 
the controversy surrounding mediator recommendations and 
made none of its own recommendations on the subject.183  
However, the Task Force did note that many family law litigants 
expressed frustration and surprise at the fact that what they 
presumed was a confidential process (mediation), was anything 
but, when they found their statements to the mediator quoted 
and provided directly to the judge in the case in the form of the 
 
 177 See infra Part IV(B)(ii). 
 178 See infra Part IV(B)(iii). 
 179 See Grillo, supra note 2, at 1552. 
 180 See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3183 (West 2004). 
 181 See, e.g., Edwards, Comments, supra note 152, at 649; Susan C. Kuhn, Comment, 
Mandatory Mediation: California Civil Code Section 4107, 33 EMORY L.J. 733, 776 (1984); 
Angel Lawrence, Capitulate or Else: San Diego’s Mandatory Mediation Process and 
Procedural Fairness, 16 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 247, 251 (2007); see also Robert 
Rubinson, Mapping the World: Facts and Meaning in Adjudication and Mediation, 63 ME. 
L. REV. 61, 64 n.16 (2010) (illustrating the current debate over which style of mediation is 
best). 
 182 See Kuhn, supra note 181, at 777. 
 183 ELKINS FINAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 45. 
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mediator’s recommendation.184  As a result, the Elkins legislation 
did adopt a change in nomenclature, so that mediators in 
“recommending” counties will no longer be referred to as 
mediators, but rather will be referred to as “child custody 
recommending counselors.”185  This change further reflects the 
Elkins legislation’s movement away from non-adversary 
procedures. 
One family law scholar, at least at first glance, seems to 
support Elkins’ move away from less adversarial processes in 
family law litigation.  In an important article, Professor Jane 
Murphy argues that the adversary system needs to be revitalized 
in the case of family law.186  Murphy is also referring to the 
“paradigm shift” discussed above in which the focus of family law 
dispute resolution has moved from the courtroom to settings such 
as the psychologist’s office, the mediation conference room, etc.  
However, Murphy’s critique is not about the different approaches 
within the adversarial system that might be used to adjudicate 
family law disputes, such as live testimony versus written 
declarations, what role minor’s counsel should play, and child 
testimony versus other means of giving children a voice in 
custody disputes.  Rather, her critique focuses on whether courts 
have the institutional competence to provide the extra-judicial 
processes of the therapeutic regime that has replaced the 
adversarial one,187 and whether these processes adequately 
protect the due process rights of family law litigants, particularly 
poor ones.188  The Elkins legislation does not, in fact, move away, 
in a fundamental fashion, from the types of extra-judicial process 
that concern Professor Murphy.  Indeed, the Elkins legislation 
includes provisions for family centered case management, 
independent evaluation, and mediation of family law disputes.  It 
will remain the case that the vast majority of California family 
law cases will settle before trial.  Thus, Professor Murphy’s 
critique does not provide support for the specific Elkins changes 
that are the focus of the present discussion.   
B. Specific Criticisms of the Elkins Family Law Changes 
This section of the article offers more particular criticisms of 
three specific legislative changes ushered in by the Elkins Report 
and its aftermath.  The move to live testimony in family law 
motion hearings, the changes to the role of minor’s counsel in 
 
 184 Id. 
 185 FAM. § 3183(a). 
 186 Murphy, supra note 6, at 891–92.  
 187 Id. at 897. 
 188 Id. at 910. 
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custody proceedings, and the increased reliance on child 
testimony in such proceedings will each be addressed. 
i.  The Presumption in Favor of Live Testimony in Motion 
Hearings 
The increased reliance on live testimony in motion hearings 
in family law cases is the single most misguided aspect of the 
Elkins legislation.  This change will do little if anything to 
increase the accuracy and reliability of judicial decision making 
in such proceedings.  Yet the costs to litigants as a result of the 
increased adversarial nature that will be engendered by the 
increased use of live testimony will be significant.  In an era of 
severe budgetary constraints for California courts, the increased 
use of live testimony will have a significant negative impact on 
both litigants and the court system itself in terms of increased 
delays and other costs in family law cases.  Further, the primary 
purpose behind the increased use of live testimony, to increase 
fairness to self-represented litigants, will not be realized by the 
Elkins changes.   
a. The Benefits of Live Testimony Do Not Outweigh the 
Costs of Increased Adversarialness 
As discussed previously, the costs of increased conflict in 
family law litigation in terms of its negative impact on parties 
and their children are significant.189  And no aspect of the family 
law litigation process engenders more conflict than the 
presentation of live testimony at a contested hearing.  Indeed, 
the courtroom confrontation remains a staple of popular culture 
vehicles including film, television, and novels, precisely because 
of the drama and conflict engendered by such courtroom 
confrontations.190  While such drama and conflict may be good for 
ratings, they are most certainly destructive for families that 
must continue to co-exist and work together after judgment is 
rendered. 
Sticking with the popular culture theme for a moment, the 
1979 Academy Award winning film Kramer v. Kramer was the 
first such vehicle to bring broad exposure to the brutality of the 
courtroom process for determining child custody disputes.191  In 
 
 189 See supra Part IV(A)(iii). 
 190 See generally Michael Asimow, Popular Culture and the Adversary System, 40 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 653, 655–56 (2007); James R. Elkins, Popular Culture, Legal Films, and 
Legal Film Critics, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 745, 746 (2007); David Ray Papke, Conventional 
Wisdom: The Courtroom Trial in American Popular Culture, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 471, 472 
(1999). 
 191 Michael Asimow, Divorce in the Movies: From the Hays Code to Kramer v. Kramer, 
24 LEGAL STUD. F. 221, 222 (2000). 
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the penultimate trial scene in the film, each of the parties’ 
lawyers destroys the opposing party on cross-examination, 
pointing out that party’s every possible failure, both as a parent 
and as a human being, in the most exaggerated terms, in order to 
sway the decision their way.192  In the film, the father, played by 
Dustin Hoffman, leans over to his lawyer after the cross-
examination of the mother, played by Meryl Streep, and asks the 
lawyer: “Did you have to be so hard on her?”  The lawyer’s 
response: “Do you want the kid or don’t you?”193 
As Hoffman’s lawyer is cross-examining Streep, while the 
tears are streaming down the witness’ face, the lawyer insists on 
an answer to his question whether she was a bad mother to her 
son.194  Hoffman shakes his head and silently whispers the word 
“no” to his former wife, even while she admits on the stand to 
being a poor parent.195  Of course, in a real courtroom proceeding, 
nothing along these lines would take place.196  The father would 
at most sit by stoically as his lawyer rips the opposing party to 
shreds, and might in fact cheer internally given that the custody 
battle, at least for that moment, seems to be going his way.  In 
any event, the damage to the parties’ ability to cooperate in co-
parenting the child in the future seems obvious.197 
It is true that family law litigation has changed significantly 
since the time of Kramer v. Kramer.198  However, it has done so 
via the proliferation of extra-judicial means of resolving family 
law disputes,199 as has been discussed previously in this paper.200  
What happens inside the courtroom, when custody disputes 
cannot be resolved outside of it, in terms of live testimony, really 
 
 192 See David Ray Papke, Peace Between the Sexes: Law and Gender in Kramer vs. 
Kramer, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 1199, 1204–05 (1996) (describing scenes from the movie) 
[hereinafter Papke, Peace]; Schepard, Kramer, supra note 153, at 681 (describing scenes 
from the movie). 
 193 Schepard, Kramer, supra note 153, at 681.  Other scholars have recognized the 
brutality of cross-examination, while at the same time recognizing its importance. See, 
e.g., MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS 161 (1990); see generally 
Robert P. Lawry, Cross-Examining the Truthful Witness: The Ideal Within the Central 
Moral Tradition of Lawyering, 100 DICK. L. REV. 563 (1996) (exploring themes in cross-
examination). 
 194 Papke, Peace, supra note 192, at 1204–05. 
 195 Id. at 1205. 
 196 Id. 
 197 To be fair, in the film, the mother ultimately relinquishes custody of the child to 
the father, even though she prevails in the courtroom proceeding. Schepard, Kramer, 
supra note 153, at 681.  However, even at the end of the film, there is no indication that 
the wounds from the courtroom battle have healed, or that the father and mother will be 
able successfully to work together in parenting their child into the future. 
 198 See, e.g., Schepard & Salem, supra note 8, at 516. 
 199 Id.; see also SCHEPARD, CHILDREN, COURTS, supra note 6, at 175. 
 200 See Part IV(A)(iii). 
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has not changed all that much from the time of the film.201  
Again, the costs engendered by the contested courtroom custody 
hearing in terms of the parties’ ability to work together in the 
future are significant. 
Given the significant increase in conflict likely to follow from 
the increased reliance on live testimony family law hearings, one 
would have to believe that the benefits to result from such an 
increase are substantial, in order to make such a change.  And 
sure enough, the Elkins Task Force displayed what I like to refer 
to as a “lawyer’s faith” that the adversary process is the best 
available means for the resolution of disputes.  Lawyers largely 
believe that the presentation of live testimony, through direct 
and cross-examination, is the best available means of discovering 
truth.202  However, this belief truly is an article of faith, because 
there is virtually no empirical evidence that demonstrates that 
the use of live testimony, as opposed to other possible fact-finding 
methods, including the provision of written or other documentary 
submissions, provides for more accurate or reliable judicial 
decision making.203 
This is particularly true in the area of family law, where all 
would agree that there is never one “correct” result of a child 
custody dispute, that courts could arrive at if they just employed 
better fact-finding and decision making procedures.204  Instead, it 
is clear that there exist a range of possible acceptable outcomes 
of a custody dispute, and there is no process available that can 
demonstrate with certainty which of those outcomes will prove to 
be best in the future—given what I previously described as the 
“forward-looking” nature of custody determinations.205  In a well-
known article focusing on this indeterminacy in child custody 
decision-making, Professor Robert Mnookin only half-jokingly 
suggested that child custody determinations should be made by a 
coin toss, rather than by the adversary litigation methods 
currently employed.206  Mnookin’s point was that given that 
 
 201 See SCHEPARD, CHILDREN, COURTS, supra note 6, at 83–84 (discussing the events 
of a divorce dispute in court). 
 202 Asimow, Popular Culture, supra note 190, at 653; Edwards, Comments, supra note 
152, at 635 (“Many attorneys pride themselves on their ability to use the adversarial 
process effectively to win their cases.”); Weinstein, supra note 141, at 84–85 (discussing 
lawyers’ stubborn allegiance to the adversary process). 
 203 See, e.g., DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 32–40 (2007) 
(discussing the lack of empirical support for the adversarial system in achieving truth). 
 204 See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 141, at 111–12; cf. SCHEPARD, CHILDREN, COURTS, 
supra note 6, at 25 (“[C]ourtroom combat between parents does not necessarily lead to 
wise or just judicial custody decision-making.”). 
 205 See supra notes 150–63 and accompanying text. 
 206 Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of 
Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 289 (Summer 1975). 
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adversary litigation methods only marginally improve the odds of 
a “correct” determination of child custody disputes over the odds 
of a coin toss, the costs of such methods, including time and 
expense to the parties and the court system, increased conflict, 
etc., do not warrant the employment of such methods.207 
Of course few of us would be willing to go so far as Mnookin 
suggests and leave child custody determinations to the toss of a 
coin.208  Most of us believe that it is worth trying to improve on 
the odds of a coin toss in terms of getting better results in child 
custody disputes, though we know that arriving at a single, 
correct outcome in child custody proceedings is an unattainable 
goal.  But where the costs of increased use of live testimony are 
well documented—in terms of time, expense, and intra-family 
conflict—and the benefits of increased use of live testimony are 
speculative and ephemeral at best, the Elkins legislation made 
the wrong choice in moving toward the increased use of  
live testimony.  Families would be best served by quick and 
determinate custody decisions that would allow them to move 
rapidly toward working to make the new arrangement succeed, 
rather than drawing out the decision-making process and 
increasing the amount of conflict involved.  
Another argument that may be made in favor of Elkins’ move 
toward live testimony is that whether or not the increased use of 
live testimony improves the outcome of child custody disputes, 
parents have a due process right to present live testimony in 
judicial proceedings that implicate their fundamental right to 
determine the nature of the relationship they will have with their 
children.209  However, the prioritizing of parental rights over the 
child’s interest in minimizing conflict and having the best 
possible ongoing relationship with both parents, has been one of 
the main focuses of the critics of reliance on adversary litigation 
methods as the primary means of resolving family law 
disputes.210  While parental rights are certainly an important 
concern, the state has parens patriae obligations to ensure the 
welfare of children that are equally weighty, and children have 
interests that must be considered as well.211  As the California 
Supreme Court pointed out, parents’ due process rights are 
adequately protected when they have a right to present live 
 
 207 Id. at 289–90. 
 208 Mnookin acknowledges as much. Id. at 290–91. 
 209 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000). 
 210 See, e.g., Clare Huntington, Rights Myopia in Child Welfare, 53 UCLA L. REV. 
637, 639–40 (2006); Firestone & Weinstein, supra note 148, at 203–04; Schepard, Kramer, 
supra note 153, at 687–88; Weinstein, supra note 141, at 88. 
 211 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 86–88 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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testimony at a final trial in child custody proceedings.212  Due 
process does not compel the presentation of live testimony at 
motion hearings, as the task force seemed to believe, and 
children’s interests in positive family dynamics going forward 
outweigh whatever interests parents have in presenting live 
testimony at motion hearings. 
b. Live Testimony Will Add to Delays in the Family 
Law Process and Raise Other Litigation Costs as 
Well 
One of the Task Force’s major goals was to reduce delay in 
family law proceedings.  The Task Force rightly noted that delays 
can be particularly problematic in family law cases.213  It is clear 
that hearings involving live testimony will generally take longer 
to conduct than prior hearings where live testimony was the 
exception rather than the rule.  Given that dockets in family law 
departments in California are already overcrowded,214 the new 
rules favoring live testimony will only exacerbate such crowding 
and delays.215  
The Task Force’s response to this concern was to call for 
greater devotion of resources to family law cases.216  The Task 
Force pointed out that the family law department has 
traditionally received short shrift when it comes to budgetary 
allocations within the trial court system.217  However, it is simply 
reckless to count on increased resources at a time when 
California and its courts face an unprecedented budgetary 
crisis.218  At least one conspiracy theorist contends that the Task 
Force deliberately sought to “crash” the family court system, 
making the delivery of greater resources and other reforms 
unavoidable.219  A more realistic view is that the Task Force 
engaged in a high stakes game of “chicken” with the 
Administrative Office of Courts and the Legislature over 
increased funding for the family law department.  Given 
California’s budgetary realities, this seems like a game the Task 
Force is certain to lose, although the real losers will be California 
family law litigants who will face even greater delays than is 
currently the case in having their cases adjudicated.  Those 
litigants who can afford it are likely to turn increasingly to 
 
 212 Elkins v. Superior Court, 163 P.3d 160, 170 (Cal. 2007). 
 213 ELKINS FINAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 39.   
 214 See, e.g., Edwards, Comments, supra note 152, at 644–45. 
 215 Repa, Reform or Wreckage, supra note 137, at 44. 
 216 ELKINS FINAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 75. 
 217 Id. 
 218 Repa, Reform or Wreckage, supra note 137, at 44. 
 219 Id. at 43–44. 
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private dispute resolution mechanisms.220  Those who cannot will 
be left to deal with the overburdened public system.  The 
resulting “two-tiered” system for resolving family law disputes—
private for those who can afford it and public for those who 
cannot—will be a particularly sad legacy of the Elkins changes.221  
The Task Force was also of the view that the current practice 
of adjudicating motions primarily through written submissions 
increases the cost of family law litigation.  It asserted that 
attorneys frequently spend a great deal of time drafting and re-
drafting lengthy declarations,222 driving up the fees charged to 
their clients.  Such declarations often include hearsay and other 
inadmissible material, thus requiring opposing counsel to invest 
a great deal of time, again at great cost to the parties, drafting 
objections to inadmissible material.223 
While these are serious concerns,224 the Task Force’s 
assumption that a shift to full blown evidentiary hearings will 
mean less attorney time, and therefore less expense to litigants 
than prior practice, seems misguided.  First of all, it is clear that 
the evidentiary hearings themselves will take longer than their 
predecessor hearings, as it will take a good deal of time for 
witnesses to testify to the evidence to be submitted.  Moreover, 
given evidentiary objections and other delays that can pop up 
during evidentiary hearings, it seems like the increase in time 
will be substantial.  Also, because many attorneys charge their 
clients more for time in court than time spent working outside of 
court, it may be that the shift to evidentiary hearings will result 
in an increase in attorney’s fees to litigants.   
However, even if the Task Force is correct that it will take 
less time to present evidence through live testimony than it 
would take to present the same evidence in written form, a net 
cost savings to clients relies on the assumption that attorneys 
will spend virtually no time outside of court preparing for the 
evidentiary hearings.  But anyone even remotely familiar with 
trial practice knows that good trial attorneys spend an 
extraordinary amount of time preparing their witness 
examinations, as well as preparing the witnesses themselves for 
direct and cross-examination.  It is downright fanciful to think 
 
 220 Id. at 44. 
 221 See Ver Steegh, supra note 167, at 659 (discussing two-tiered justice system that 
results from overburdened and under-funded family court systems). 
 222 ELKINS FINAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 27. 
 223 Id. 
 224 California did address these concerns to a certain extent by modifying its 
statewide court rules in family law cases to limit the length of declarations in most 
instances to ten pages. See CAL. R. CT. 5.118(f) (as amended effective July 1, 2011). 
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that the shift to live testimony will save attorney time in contrast 
to current practice when preparation time and hearing time are 
taken into account.  Yet even if the Task Force is correct, a 
conclusion that clients will save money in attorney’s fees under 
the new regime requires a further assumption that attorneys will 
stop spending time drafting, filing, and objecting to evidentiary 
declarations once the opportunity to present live testimony at 
hearings is available.  But this too seems like an unfounded 
assumption.  Attorneys will continue to submit evidentiary 
declarations at hearings, in addition to live testimony, at 
continued high costs to clients for a variety of reasons. 
First, the Elkins decision and section 2009 of the California 
Civil Procedure Code make clear that evidentiary declarations 
are still admissible at motion hearings despite the Elkins 
legislation.225  So attorneys will have to make strategic decisions 
about which evidence they wish to present through live 
testimony, and which evidence through declaration.  Further, 
section 217 of the California Family Code and Rule 5.119 of the 
California Rules of Court still give judges a great deal of 
discretion as to how live testimony is admitted, and what live 
testimony to admit.  There is a great deal of uncertainty among 
family law practitioners regarding exactly how the move to live 
testimony will play out in practice.226  Thus, at least until 
practice under the Elkins legislation sorts itself out, it is likely 
that cautious attorneys will err on the side of presenting evidence 
in both formats, rather than risk that the evidence will not be 
admitted if one format is relied on to the exclusion of the other.  
Indeed, many family law attorneys who are not experienced in 
the presentation of live evidence will likely submit evidentiary 
declarations to cover in the event that they fail to introduce 
successfully certain evidence through live testimony.  
Additionally, given the scheduling challenges that are going to be 
imposed by the Elkins legislation,227 cautious attorneys will also 
present evidentiary declarations to cover for the fact that they 
may not be able to secure enough hearing time to present all of 
the evidence they wish to present through live testimony.  Thus, 
the end result is likely to be a combination of live and written 
testimony at family law hearings, ultimately increasing the 
amount of attorney time involved in preparing for and conducting 
 
 225 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2009 (West 2007). 
 226 Repa, Reform or Wreckage, supra note 137, at 44 (“Many family law practitioners 
say the recommendations could actually wreak havoc with the panel’s stated goals.”); see 
also CAL. FAM. CODE § 217 (West 2011); CAL. R. CT. 5.119 (as amended effective July 1, 
2011). 
 227 See supra notes 214–15 and accompanying text. 
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such hearings, resulting in an increase in the cost of litigation to 
clients rather than the decrease anticipated by the Task Force. 
c. The Issue of Self-Represented Litigants 
In recent decades, there has been a virtual explosion in the 
number of self-represented litigants appearing in our courts.228  
This development has perhaps been most prevalent in the family 
law branch of our court system.229  The strains that this 
development has placed upon judges, court personnel, and court 
systems as a whole are palpable.230  Perhaps more importantly, 
the litigants who represent themselves often find their 
experiences in the judicial system to be extremely frustrating,231 
and there is little doubt that self-represented litigants often 
obtain significantly poorer outcomes through their judicial 
proceedings than would have been the case had they been 
represented by competent counsel.232 
Despite these facts, there is little reason to believe that the 
flood of self-represented litigants is likely to abate in the 
foreseeable future.  For this reason, judges, court administrators, 
and lawyers have responded with a variety of innovations in 
order to address the problems created by the increase in self-
representation.233  There is little doubt that both the California 
Supreme Court in Elkins, and the Task Force that followed it, 
were trying to address both the specific barriers imposed on 
Jeffrey Elkins in trying to represent himself effectively in his 
individual case, as well as the barriers imposed on self-
represented litigants more generally in family court.  However, 
 
 228 See, e.g., Feitz, supra note 31, at 194; Stephen Landsman, The Growing Challenge 
of Pro Se Litigation, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 439, 440 (2009); Drew A. Swank, 
Comment, The Pro Se Phenomenon, 19 B.Y.U J. PUB. L. 373, 376 (2005) [hereinafter 
Swank, Pro Se]. 
 229 See, e.g., Berenson, Family Law, supra note 31, at 110; Goldschmidt, supra note 
31, at 36.  
 230 See, e.g., Berenson, Family Law, supra note 31, at 112 (“The burgeoning number 
of self-represented litigants, particularly in the family law area, has placed great 
demands on the limited time resources available to court staff.”); Feitz, supra note 31, at 
195; Landsman, supra note 228, at 449; Swank, Pro Se, supra note 228, at 384. 
 231 See Goldschmidt, supra note 31, at 37. 
 232 See Engler, supra note 33, at 1988.  
 233 Among these innovations are simplified court forms that laypersons can fill out, in 
place of traditional pleadings. Berenson, Family Law, supra note 31, at 123; Margaret B. 
Flaherty, Note, How Courts Help You Help Yourself: The Internet and the Pro Se Divorce 
Litigant, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 91, 93 (2002).  Educational programs to assist self-represented 
litigants in filling out these forms and in representing themselves in court have been 
provided by court personnel and a variety of legal services providers. See Berenson, 
Family Law, supra note 31, at 127; Feitz, supra note 31, at 204; Landsman, supra note 
228, at 455–56.  Such forms, along with assistance in filling them out, can be made 
available online, to make them even more accessible to self-represented litigants. 
Flaherty, supra, at 91.   
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there are serious questions whether the means chosen by the 
Task Force and the subsequent legislation were the best possible 
ways to achieve this goal. 
The Task Force and the Legislature rejected an approach 
that provided detailed rules regarding the steps that need to be 
taken prior to their hearings in order for self-represented 
litigants to have their evidence considered by the court.234  
Instead, they favored an approach that defers most of that work 
to the hearings themselves, in terms of decisions regarding the 
admissibility of different types of live testimony at the hearing.  
But there is no reason to believe that self-represented litigants 
will do a better job of navigating the rules of evidence and other 
procedural requirements during the course of their hearings than 
they did in relation to the pre-trial filings required by prior rules.  
Thus, the Task Force and the Legislature seem to rely on the 
ability of trial judges to play an active role in assisting self-
represented litigants to present their cases during hearings, 
whereas judges are not able to play such a role with regard to 
filings that must be provided prior to hearings. 
It is true that a number of academics have similarly focused 
on the role of trial judges as a critical component in assisting self-
represented litigants to present their cases more effectively.235  
However, many judges themselves express deep discomfort with 
a role that would have them be more active in assisting one or 
more of the parties to a dispute in presenting their cases.  At 
heart, many judges see such a role as violating the fundamental 
tenet of judging—neutrality.236  Indeed, particularly where one of 
the parties is represented by counsel and one is not, assisting the 
self-represented party might even be seen as punishing the 
represented party for their decision to retain an attorney.  
Further, many judges feel extremely uncomfortable offering 
assistance to a litigant when the judge actually knows very little 
about the details of, and facts and circumstances surrounding, 
the litigant’s case.  Add in caseload pressures, frequent rotations 
in and out of different trial court departments, and often little 
experience with family law, and the primary reliance on trial 
 
 234 See supra notes 65–71 and accompanying text. 
 235 See, e.g., Baldacci, supra note 33, at 688; Engler, supra note 33, at 2028; Russell 
Engler, Ethics in Transition: Unrepresented Litigants and the Changing Judicial Role, 22 
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 367, 368 (2008); Goldschmidt, supra note 31, at 48.   
 236 See, e.g., Hon. Robert Bacharach & Lyn Entzeroth, Judicial Advocacy in Pro Se 
Litigation: A Return to Neutrality, 42 IND. L. REV. 19, 42–43 (2009); Hon. Gerald W. 
Hardcastle, Adversarialism and the Family Court: A Family Court Judge’s Perspective, 9 
U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 57, 120–21 (2005); see also Drew A. Swank, In Defense of 
Rules and Roles: The Need to Curb Extreme Forms of Pro Se Assistance and 
Accommodation in Litigation, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 1537, 1583 (2005).   
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judges to help self-represented litigants effectively to present 
their cases seems misguided.237 
Ultimately, it may be necessary for courts to play a more 
active role in assisting self-represented litigants to present their 
cases.  However, it seems that the burden of dealing with the 
self-representation crisis should continue to be shared by judges 
with other court personnel, bar associations, legal services 
providers, and other public and private resources.  Certainly 
counties like Contra Costa could have and should have done a 
better job of drafting their pre-hearing rules and procedures to be 
more accessible to lay persons such as Jeffrey Elkins, and also 
could have done more to provide assistance, both inside and 
outside of the courthouse, to self-represented litigants in 
complying with those rules and procedures.  But it is simply too 
much to ask trial judges alone to make up for those failures. 
ii.  Modifying the Role of Minor’s Counsel in Custody Cases 
In theory, two distinct approaches are available to provide 
children with a “voice” in child custody proceedings.  The first 
approach involves appointing a GAL to represent the child’s 
interest in the litigation.238  The GAL is charged with advancing 
the “best interests” of the child in the case.239  While the GAL 
may be a lawyer, a non-lawyer may also be appointed.240  The 
court may utilize any one of a number of approaches to receiving 
the GAL’s input into the decision making process.  For example, 
the GAL may testify as a witness during the custody proceedings, 
but more commonly, the GAL presents a written report to the 
court.241   
Aside from appointing a GAL, a court may also appoint an 
attorney to represent the child in custody proceedings.  In such 
instances, there is a divergence of roles that can be played by the 
child’s attorney.  First, to the extent the child is old enough and 
mature enough to have formulated an expressed preference 
regarding the outcome of the case, the attorney may work to 
 
 237 Repa, Reform or Wreckage, supra note 137, at 30. 
 238 See Elrod, Client-Directed Lawyers, supra note 36, at 907–08 (“[Guardian ad 
litems] advocate for the best interests of the child by conducting an investigation, writing 
reports or otherwise making recommendations with some required to inform the court if 
the child’s wishes differ . . . .”); Dana E. Prescott, The Guardian Ad Litem in Custody and 
Conflict Cases: Investigator, Champion, and Referee?, 22 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 
529, 537–39 (2000). 
 239 SCHEPARD, CHILDREN, COURTS, supra note 6, at 142. 
 240 Id. at 143. 
 241 See Linda D. Elrod, Raising the Bar for Lawyers Who Represent Children: ABA 
Standards of Practice for Custody Cases, 37 FAM. L.Q. 105, 115–16 (2003) [hereinafter 
Elrod, Raising the Bar]. 
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advance the expressed preference of the child.242  Indeed, this is 
consistent with the traditional understanding of the role of an 
attorney—to advocate for the lawful objectives of the client.243  
On the other hand, if the child is either too young or too 
immature to express a preference as to the outcome of the 
proceedings, or is unwilling to do so, the attorney may represent 
the child on a “best interests” or “substituted judgment” basis.244   
In practice, jurisdictions are all over the map in terms of the 
variations and combinations among these alternatives that are 
actually employed.  For example, some states provide for the 
appointment of an attorney for the child, but define the 
attorney’s role similarly to that of a GAL as described above.245  
Other states provide for hybrid attorney/GAL roles, or other 
variations on the above-described alternatives.246  Further, some 
jurisdictions call for attorneys to represent children involved in 
custody proceedings on a best interests basis even if the child is 
mature enough to express a preference as to the outcome of the 
proceedings.247  In such instances, the attorney might advocate 
for an outcome that is at odds with the expressed preference of 
the child if the attorney believes that the child’s preference is not 
the outcome that would be in the child’s best interests.248 
Additionally, appointing a GAL and an attorney are not 
mutually exclusive options.  A court may be able to appoint both 
in the same case.249  In such circumstances, the most common 
approach is for the attorney to act as lawyer for the GAL, who 
stands in the place of the child client in terms of directing the 
lawyer’s activities.  However, it would be possible in some 
circumstances for the attorney to advocate for the child’s 
expressed wishes, and for the GAL to advocate for what the GAL 
believes to be in the child’s best interests—where the GAL 
 
 242 See Elrod, Client-Directed Lawyers, supra note 36, at 911; SCHEPARD, CHILDREN, 
COURTS, supra note 6, at 142. 
 243 See, e.g., David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REV. 468, 
470–71 (1990). 
 244 See Elrod, Client-Directed Lawyers, supra note 36, at 910–11. 
 245 See Atwood, Best Interests, supra note 44, at 391 (“[M]ost states in the United 
States continue to permit children’s lawyers to engage in best interests representation.”); 
Barbara Ann Atwood, The Uniform Representation of Children in Abuse, Neglect, and 
Custody Proceedings Act: Bridging the Divide Between Pragmatism and Idealism, 42 FAM. 
L.Q. 63, 75 (2008) [hereinafter Atwood, Bridging the Divide] (“[M]any states routinely 
appoint lawyers as guardians ad litem without careful delineation of the distinctions 
between the two roles.”); Elrod, Client-Directed Lawyers, supra note 36, at 908. 
 246 See Atwood, Best Interests, supra note 44, at 391–92; Elrod, Client-Directed 
Lawyers, supra note 36, at 908–09. 
 247 See supra notes 37–42 (discussing California law and the role of the lawyer). 
 248 See, e.g., SCHEPARD, CHILDREN, COURTS, supra note 6, at 144 (discussing 
Carballeira v. Shumway, 710 N.Y.S.2d 149 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000)).  
 249 Atwood, Best Interests, supra note 44, at 391–92. 
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believes that the child’s expressed preferences are contrary to 
their best interests.  However, in family court, there are 
generally no public resources to pay for either GALs or attorneys 
for children in custody cases.250  Given, as discussed above, that 
most parties do not even hire attorneys to represent themselves 
in custody proceedings, it seems unlikely that most parties will 
have the resources to pay for either an attorney for the child, or a 
GAL, let alone both, in the context of custody proceedings.  Thus, 
child representation, in whatever form, is the exception, rather 
than the rule in custody proceedings. 
In California, prior to the Elkins legislation, the statutory 
scheme for child representation in family court should perhaps be 
described as a combination between the roles of GAL and best 
interests attorney.  Formally, California law did not provide for 
the appointment of a GAL in family court.251  However, sections 
3150 and 3151 of the California Family Code do allow a court to 
appoint counsel to represent the child in custody proceedings if 
the court determines that doing so would be in the child’s best 
interests.252  Further, under section 3151, the child’s attorney is 
to represent the best interests of the child.253  And, under the 
prior version of section 3151, the court could require the child’s 
attorney to submit a written “statement of issues and contentions 
setting forth the facts that bear on the best interests of the 
child.”254  Such a statement was virtually indistinguishable from 
the report traditionally prepared by a GAL for the court.  
There has been a tremendous amount of discussion in recent 
years among legal scholars and advocates for children regarding 
the appropriate role for attorneys representing children in child 
custody proceedings.255  Though the discussion has often been 
 
 250 SCHEPARD, CHILDREN, COURTS, supra note 6, at 147.  By contrast, most states 
provide funding to pay for representation for children in juvenile court proceedings.  See 
supra note 34. 
 251 In re Marriage of Lloyd, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 37, 39–40 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997). 
 252 CAL. FAM. CODE § 3150(a) (West 2004). 
 253 FAM. § 3151(a) (West 2011). 
 254 FAM. § 3151(b) (West 1998), amended by Stats. 2010 ch. 352 § 15 (AB 939) 
(effective Jan. 1, 2011); Pellman, A Child-Centered Response, supra note 41, at 116. 
 255 Two conferences, attended by many of the nation’s leading children’s law scholars 
and advocates, taking place a decade apart, published recommendations regarding the 
appropriate role for lawyers to play in representing children. See generally 
Recommendations of the Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation of 
Children, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1301 (1996); Recommendations of the UNLV Conference on 
Representing Children in Families: Child Advocacy and Justice Ten Years After Fordham, 
6 NEV. L.J. 592 (2006).  Further, a number of professional organizations have 
promulgated standards offered to guide attorneys in the representation of children.  For 
example, in 2003 the American Bar Association promulgated its Standards of Practice for 
Lawyers Representing Children in Custody Cases, reprinted in 37 FAM. L.Q. 131 (2003).  
In 2006, the Uniform Law Commission (ULC) (formerly known as the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law) offered its Uniform Representation 
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heated, it seems that a broad consensus has emerged from this 
debate regarding a couple of points.  The first is that lawyers 
should act like lawyers in custody proceedings, and not like 
GALs.256  Thus, lawyers should be limited to presenting 
information to the court in the manner that lawyers have 
traditionally presented information to the court—through 
admissible evidence and proper legal argument.  Therefore, 
lawyers should be prohibited from offering personal opinions 
regarding the outcome of custody proceedings, from testifying as 
witnesses in custody proceedings, and offering reports to the 
court, like GALs traditionally offered, containing hearsay and 
other inadmissible evidence.257 
The second point of consensus to emerge from this debate is, 
at least in circumstances where the child is mature enough to 
express a preference regarding the outcome of the proceedings, 
that best interests representation is inappropriate, and that the 
attorney for the child should adhere to the traditionally accepted 
role for counsel of advocating for the lawful preferences of their 
client.258  Two separate justifications have been advanced for this 
second point.  First, it is contended that best interests 
representation is incompatible with the basic ethical 
requirements of attorney representation, because the 
agent/lawyer is freed from following the directives of the 
principal/client.259  The other justification is that, to the extent 
best interests representation allows the child’s attorney to 
advocate for an outcome that is contradictory to the expressed 
preferences of the child, the child is essentially deprived of 
having a voice relating to the outcome of the proceedings that are 
supposed to be primarily about the child to begin with.260  Many 
would contend that children have a right of some type, to have 
their preferences heard and considered in proceedings that will 
 
of Children in Abuse, Neglect, and Custody Proceedings Act. UNIFORM REPRESENTATION 
OF CHILDREN IN ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS ACT (2007).  However, a 
contentious debate caused the ULC to withdraw the Act from consideration by the ABA 
House of Delegates. See Atwood, Bridging the Divide, supra note 245, at 72–73; Martin 
Guggenheim, The AAML’s Revised Standards for Representing Children in Custody and 
Visitation Proceedings: The Reporter’s Perspective, 22 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 
251, 269–75 (2009) [hereinafter Guggenheim, AAML].  And, in 2009, the American 
Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers promulgated its Standards for Attorneys and GALs in 
custody proceedings. Am. Acad. of Matrimonial Lawyers, Representing Children: 
Standards for Attorneys for Children in Custody or Visitation Proceedings with 
Commentary, 22 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 227 (2009).  For an overview of each of 
these proposals, see Atwood, Best Interests, supra note 44, at 387–89. 
 256 See, e.g., Elrod, Raising the Bar, supra note 241, at 115–19. 
 257 Id. 
 258 See Atwood, Bridging the Divide, supra note 245, at 90–91. 
 259 Id. at 92. 
 260 Id. 
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have such a dramatic effect on the child’s life,261 and that best 
interests representation deprives the child of that voice. 
The consensus disappears, to a certain extent, for children 
who either cannot, or will not express a preference regarding the 
outcome of the proceedings, whether due to age, incapacity, or 
another reason.  In such circumstances, some scholars and child 
advocates would allow for best interests representation.262  On 
the other hand, others would argue that child representation 
should be forgone entirely in such circumstances.263  
On review, it is clear that the Elkins legislation is halfway 
consistent with the scholarly consensus described above.  First, 
the change to section 3151 that prevents judges from requiring 
children’s lawyers to submit a statement of issues and 
contentions is consistent with the view that lawyers should act as 
lawyers in custody proceedings, and should be prohibited from 
acting as GALs traditionally have.264  On the other hand, the 
Elkins legislation also maintains best interests representation as 
the role to be played by children’s lawyers in custody 
proceedings.265  While it is true that the revised section 3151 
requires children’s lawyers to present the child’s wishes to the 
court if the child so requests (the former statute gave the child’s 
lawyer discretion whether or not to present the child’s wishes to 
the court),266 it still allows the lawyer to argue against the child’s 
expressed preference if the lawyer believes that doing so is in the 
child’s best interests. 
The result of the Elkins legislation is a somewhat incoherent 
role for children’s attorneys in California custody proceedings.  
On the one hand, lawyers will be confined to their traditional 
roles of presenting admissible evidence and argument in support 
of their positions in court.  On the other hand, they will continue 
to be required to pursue the best interests of their child clients, 
despite the arguments that best interests representation is 
incompatible with the traditional role of an attorney as an 
advocate for the lawful pursuits of their client.  Further though, 
lawyers for children will be required to present the child’s 
 
 261 See infra notes 282–83 and accompanying text. 
 262 See Atwood, Best Interests, supra note 44, at 423 (“If lawyers should take on a 
broader ‘moral’ view of their responsibilities vis-à-vis their clients with full capacity, a 
lawyer for a child who cannot direct counsel surely acts within his or her professional role 
when pursuing that client’s interests.”). 
 263 Guggenheim, AAML, supra note 255, at 278 (explaining that restricting a child’s 
lawyer’s role to enforcing substantive rights can significantly restrict the lawyer’s 
prerogatives). 
 264 See supra notes 251–54 and accompanying text. 
 265 See supra notes 36–42 and accompanying text. 
 266 See supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
Do Not Delete 2/1/2012 2:10 PM 
482 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 15:3 
preference to the court, even where the lawyer believes that 
preference to be incompatible with the very best interests of the 
child that the lawyer has been charged with pursuing. 
This author somewhat reluctantly agrees with the Elkins 
legislation’s decision to confine children’s attorneys to the 
presentation of admissible evidence and argument at trial, rather 
than presenting a statement of issues and contentions, testifying 
as a witness, or stating a personal opinion regarding the outcome 
of the proceedings.  The policies behind the well-entrenched 
“advocate-witness rule,”267 support the notion that GAL-like 
functions are incompatible with the role of an attorney 
representing a client in contested litigation.268  However, while it 
is appropriate that lawyers be required to act as lawyers at all 
times, forcing lawyers into a more traditional role as adversary 
advocates is also likely to further increase the “adversarialness” 
of child custody proceedings, a result that was decried in 
previous parts of this paper. 
Additionally, it does seem that something important is lost 
in depriving the court of the potentially important source of 
relatively neutral information that can come from child 
attorneys’ statements of issues and contentions.269  Alas, as has 
been pointed out previously, too often parents enmeshed in hotly 
contested custody disputes lose sight of their children’s best 
interests.270  In such circumstances, the court really is in a 
position to benefit from a relatively neutral, yet thorough 
examination of the issues and evidence in the case.  California 
law does provide for input from a wide variety of such non-party 
sources in custody litigation including custody evaluators, 
psychologists, and parenting coordinators.  However, as 
 
 267 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.7 (2007).  Rule 3.7 provides: 
(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to 
be a necessary witness unless: 
(1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue; 
(2) the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services 
rendered in the case; or 
(3) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the 
client. 
(b) A lawyer may act as advocate in a trial in which another lawyer in the 
lawyer’s firm is likely to be called as a witness unless precluded from doing so 
by Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9. 
 268 The essential conflict is between the lawyer’s obligation as an advocate to advance 
the interests of their client with the lawyer’s obligation as a witness to be completely 
candid with the court, even if the resulting testimony will be adverse to the client’s 
objectives. See, e.g., Douglas R. Richmond, Lawyers as Witnesses, 36 N.M. L. REV. 47, 48–
49 (2006). 
 269 Pellman, A Child-Centered Response, supra note 41, at 116–17. 
 270 See supra notes 152–65 and accompanying text. 
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mentioned above, the economic realities of private party custody 
litigation are such that the availability of such independent 
evaluations is likely to be strictly limited in most cases. 271  
Indeed, the value of a statement of issues and contentions is 
consistent with the availability of evaluative mediation in 
California custody cases.  While this paper was critical of 
evaluative mediation earlier,272 that criticism was based upon: (1) 
the incompatibility of the mediator’s role as a facilitator of 
agreements and the role of recommending counselor, and (2) the 
limitations on the mediator’s ability to engage in reliable fact-
finding in support of her recommendations.  Relating to the 
latter, because the mediator has no authority to engage in fact-
finding, other than through the unsworn statements of the 
parties during a single, short mediation session, the factual 
findings relied on by mediators in making their recommendations 
are particularly suspect.  By contrast, children’s attorneys 
writing statements of issues and contentions had a much greater 
opportunity, and indeed an obligation, to interview witnesses, 
review documents, and engage in a wide variety of other fact 
finding activities that made the basis for their recommendations 
much more reliable than those relied on by mediators in making 
their recommendations.273 
Still, the incompatibility of the child attorney’s role with that 
of a GAL makes clear to me that the change away from 
statements of issues and contentions is proper.  Yet, in order to 
make up for what was lost in making that change, the Elkins 
legislation should have simultaneously created the authority on 
the part of the family court to appoint a non-lawyer GAL in 
instances where it would be beneficial to do so.  That way, the 
court would still have the benefits of a statement of issues and 
contentions, without bringing about the conflicts inherent in 
having the child’s attorney prepare such a report.  As outlined 
above, resource limitations will probably make it unlikely that in 
many cases courts will appoint both a GAL and an attorney for 
the child, but the Elkins legislation should have established the 
possibility to do so, where such a result would serve the best 
interests of the child, and resources will allow for it. 
Establishing the ability to appoint a GAL in limited 
circumstances would also have allowed the Elkins legislation to 
abandon best interests representation, and bring California law 
into line with the emerging consensus among legal scholars and 
 
 271 See supra notes 249–50 and accompanying text. 
 272 See supra notes 179–85 and accompanying text. 
 273 See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3151(a) (West 2006). 
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children’s advocates that such representation is inappropriate.274  
I have more confidence in attorneys’ ability to engage in best 
interests representation in a professionally appropriate manner 
than most of the critics of best interests representation.275  
Indeed, there is evidence that attorneys who represent children 
in practice actually engage in something of a hybrid between best 
interests and child’s preference representation regardless of the 
label placed on their appointment.276  Nonetheless, the 
availability of a GAL where appropriate would allow California 
to move from best interests representation to child preference, 
thus rendering the child’s attorney’s role to be more in line with 
the move away from statements of issues and contentions and 
toward traditional attorney advocacy.  In cases where the child is 
too young or is unwilling to express a preference to direct her 
lawyer’s performance, the court could appoint a non-lawyer GAL, 
either with or without a lawyer to represent the child/GAL.  
Similarly, the court could also appoint a GAL for an older child if 
there was reason to believe that the child’s preference being 
advocated by the child’s attorney was potentially adverse to the 
child’s best interests.  Thus, the Elkins legislation should have 
provided for GALs in family law cases and abandoned best 
interests attorney representation in favor of child preference 
advocacy where the child is mature enough to state a reasoned 
preference. 
iii.  Increased Use of Child Testimony in Custody Cases 
Though not part of the Elkins legislation itself, AB 1050 was 
enacted around the same time as the Elkins legislation, and 
clearly furthers the Elkins Commission’s objective of giving 
children a greater “voice” in child custody proceedings.  Prior to 
its amendment via AB 1050, section 3042 of the California 
Family Code, did provide that “[i]f a child is of sufficient age and 
capacity to reason so as to form an intelligent preference as to 
custody, the court shall consider and give due weight to the 
wishes of the child in making an order granting or modifying 
custody.”277  The statute also granted the court considerable 
latitude to determine the manner in which the child’s preference 
would be ascertained, so as to best protect the interests of the 
child.278  
 
 274 See supra notes 255–57 and accompanying text. 
 275 Accord Atwood, Best Interests, supra note 44, at 412–13. 
 276 See, e.g., Leary v. Leary, 627 A.2d 30, 36–42 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993) (child’s 
attorney properly balanced child advocacy and reporting roles in custody litigation). 
 277 FAM. § 3042(a) (amended 2010). 
 278 FAM. § 3042(b). 
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As amended, section 3042 mandates: “If the child is 14 years 
of age or older and wishes to address the court regarding custody 
or visitation, the child shall be permitted to do so, unless the 
court determines that doing so is not in the child’s best 
interests.”279 
If the court determines that allowing the child to address the 
court with regard to her preference is not in the child’s best 
interests, the court must state its reasons for that finding on the 
record.280  The revised statute goes on to make clear that nothing 
in the above-quoted provision shall be construed to prevent a 
child who is less than fourteen years of age from addressing the 
court with regard to custody or visitation.281 
There is nearly universal agreement that the views of 
children who are mature enough to have an opinion regarding 
the custody arrangements that will affect them at a minimum 
should be considered in determining those custody 
arrangements.282  Indeed, the widely-ratified United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child recognizes a right of 
participation on the part of children in legal proceedings affecting 
their interests.283  After all, it is the child who must live with 
decisions that are made regarding where the child will reside, 
which parent the child will spend the bulk of her time with, 
where the child will go to school, etc.  However, consensus is 
much more elusive when it comes to questions of the weight that 
should be placed on the child’s preference regarding custody 
arrangements, as well as the manner in which the child’s input 
into the custody proceedings should be obtained. 
There is also widespread agreement, at least among 
psychologists, if not among lawyers and children’s rights 
advocates, that placing children “in the middle” of custody 
disputes between their parents may subject the children to 
significant psychological harm.284  Placing significant weight on 
 
 279 FAM. § 3042(c) (West 2011) (emphasis added). 
 280 FAM. § 3042(c). 
 281 FAM. § 3042(d). 
 282 See Annette Ruth Appell, Representing Children Representing What?: Critical 
Reflections on Lawyering for Children, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 573, 575 (2008); 
Elrod, Client-Directed Lawyers, supra note 36, at 870; Cynthia Starnes, Swords in the 
Hands of Babes: Rethinking Custody Interviews After Troxel, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 115, 123 
(2003). 
 283 Appell, supra note 282, at 575 & nn.3–4 (noting that the United States is one of 
only two countries that have failed to ratify the treaty). 
 284 See, e.g., EMERY, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, supra note 48, at 20; Robert E. Emery, 
Children’s Voices: Listening—and Deciding—is an Adult Responsibility, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 
621, 623 (2003) [hereinafter Emery, Children’s Voices]; Richard A. Warshak, Payoffs and 
Pitfalls of Listening to Children, 52 FAM. REL. 373, 374–76 (2003); Firestone & Weinstein, 
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the child’s preference places the child at risk of being 
manipulated or pressured, intentionally or unintentionally, by 
one or both of the parents.285  A variety of tactics may be 
employed by a parent to corrupt a child’s view of the other 
parent.286  The damage that may result to the child’s relationship 
with the other parent may be difficult to undo.287  Further, a 
child’s preference as to custody may be influenced by fear of a 
parent, in the event the child chooses to reside with the other 
parent, or excessive concern for the welfare of a parent who may 
feel abandonment if the child chooses to live with the other 
parent.288  And, of course, children are susceptible to being 
“bribed” by a parent in the form of gifts, excessively lenient 
household rules, etc.289  Even absent any form of undue influence 
being exerted on the child, the mere fact of having to choose 
between two parents that the child loves places an enormous 
burden on the child, that most would wish to avoid.290 
Two factors seem likely to exacerbate the potential harm 
caused to children through involvement in their parents’ custody 
disputes.  The first relates to the weight to be accorded to the 
child’s preference.  The second relates to the manner in which the 
child’s preference will be ascertained and presented to the court 
for consideration.  As to the first, it stands to reason that the 
more weight that will be placed upon a child’s preference in 
deciding custody proceedings, the more pressure the child will 
feel in stating their preference, and the more susceptible the 
child will be to manipulation and other tactics that may cause 
long-term detriment to the child. 
As to the second, there are a number of possible ways that a 
child’s preference may be introduced for consideration by the 
court in reaching a decision with regard to a custody dispute.  
For example, the child’s preference could be solicited by minor’s 
counsel, a GAL, a mediator/recommending counselor, a custody 
evaluator, or by the judge herself in camera.  Alternatively, the 
child’s preference may be elicited through testimony in open 
court, with the child subject to cross-examination by the parties’ 
attorneys, and perhaps by minor’s counsel as well.  Common 
sense suggests that the more private and non-coercive means 
used to elicit the child’s preference, the less pressure these 
 
 285 Warshak, supra note 284, at 375. 
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(1998). 
 287 Warshak, supra note 284, at 375. 
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procedures are likely to place on the child, and the less damage 
that is likely to be incurred.  On the other hand, the more public 
and coercive the means used to elicit the child’s preference, the 
more harmful such proceedings are likely to be to the child’s 
long-term psychological interests.  Indeed, the legal literature is 
replete with accounts of the damage caused to adult witnesses, 
often ones with little stake in the outcome of the proceedings, 
caused by rigorous cross-examination.291  One can only imagine 
the harm to a child of being rigorously cross-examined, 
potentially by three separate lawyers, in a proceeding that is 
going to determine the future course of the child’s life. 
It is thus possible to imagine a continuum of possibilities for 
incorporating a child’s voice into a custody dispute.  On the most 
advantageous side, concerned parents would delicately and 
privately seek information relating to the child’s preference with 
regard to a custody determination.  Such an information 
gathering process might not even directly raise the issue of 
custody with the child, but rather would seek out the child’s 
views indirectly, through questions that would not directly 
threaten or place the child in the middle of the custody dispute.292  
The parents would then privately reach agreement as to a 
custody arrangement that would give consideration to the child’s 
preferences, along with other factors relating to the child’s best 
interests.293 
On the other hand, we can also imagine a scenario where 
parents involved in high-conflict litigation might solicit the 
child’s input through interviews with each parent’s retained 
counsel, and place implicit or explicit pressure on the child to 
express a preference in favor of that parent.  The child’s 
preference will then be presented to the court through live 
testimony, subject to rigorous cross-examination by the non-
favored parent’s attorney. 
Naturally, one would conclude that the first scenario is 
preferable in terms of incorporating the child’s voice into custody 
disputes.  As stated by Professor Andrew Schepard: 
Even the most vigorous advocates of considering a child’s preference 
in a custody dispute do not suggest that the child should be sworn as a 
witness and cross-examined by his or her parents’ lawyers in front of 
 
 291 See supra note 193 and accompanying text. 
 292 See, e.g., Emery, Children’s Voices, supra note 284, at 622–26 (describing a case 
study and an example to illustrate ways to communicate with children to lessen their 
burden). 
 293 Id. at 626. 
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his or her parents.  They recognize that a courtroom confrontation of 
this sort could irreparably poison the parent-child relationship.294 
However, I fear that the changes to section 3042 of the 
California Family Code move us precisely in that direction.  It is 
true that even as amended, section 3042 does not require a child 
to express a preference as to custody, nor does it require any 
preference to be presented through child testimony.  However, 
the legislative changes significantly increase the likelihood of 
both occurrences. 
The former section 3042 was broad enough to allow for a 
child’s preference to be considered in custody proceedings, and for 
that preference to be expressed through child testimony where 
appropriate.  However, the new section 3042 clearly increases the 
likelihood that the child will be drawn into the middle of custody 
litigation by expressing a preference on the record.  Now, the 
court cannot deny the right of a child fourteen years of age or 
older to state a preference in the case, unless the court makes 
written findings as to why it would not be in the best interests of 
the child to do so—a significant deterrent to trial judges who are 
often loathe to take the time and effort to make such written 
findings.  Further, the clear legislative intent behind the changes 
was to increase the consideration of child preference in custody 
proceedings, otherwise there would have been no point in 
amending the statute to begin with.  Judges are likely to get the 
message of the point behind the statutory change in applying 
their authority regarding the consideration of child preference in 
custody litigation.  Further, subsection (e) of the amended statute 
requires the court to provide alternative means of soliciting input 
from the child as to the child’s preference should the court 
preclude calling the child as a witness.295  This provision seems to 
set up live testimony as the default mechanism for receiving 
input from the child, with all other means offered as second 
alternatives.  It is almost certain to have the effect of causing 
more children to testify in their parents’ custody cases.296 
Drawing children further into the middle of their parents’ 
custody disputes seems particularly problematic in light of the 
other previously discussed changes from the Elkins legislation 
that are likely to increase the adversarial nature of custody 
litigation.  Increasing the acrimony of custody battles, and then 
placing children squarely in the middle of them, runs precisely 
counter to the findings of a generation of scholars who have 
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 295 CAL. FAM. CODE § 3042(e) (West 2011). 
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studied the harms to children that result from their involvement 
in such proceedings. 
V.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
The legislative changes that are the focus of this article are 
misguided because they run directly counter to the salutary, 
decades-long trend in family law away from reliance on 
traditional, adversary litigation as the primary means of 
resolving family law disputes.  Adversary litigation has been 
shown, in many instances, to be costly and damaging to the 
relationships of the parties involved in family law cases, and 
particularly harmful to children who are dragged into the vortex 
of their parents’ disputes, and then subject to the continuing 
effects of the strain placed upon the parents’ ability to cooperate 
in raising the children into the future.  Yet the increased use of 
live testimony in family law motion hearings, the redefinition of 
the role of minor’s counsel in custody cases to more closely 
resemble that of adversarial advocates, and the increased 
reliance on child testimony in custody cases will all have the 
effect of moving California back in the direction of adversarialism 
in family law litigation. 
The goals of the California Supreme Court in the Elkins 
decision, and the corresponding task force, could have been 
achieved through other measures that would not have had the 
negative consequence of increased adversarialism.  Here are 
some recommendations. 
A. Eliminate Evaluative Mediation in Custody Cases 
There is virtually universal agreement that except in rare 
cases involving domestic violence or other gross disparities in 
capacity between spouses, negotiated agreements in family law 
cases benefit both the parties to the dispute, the court system as 
a whole, and the children who are the subject of the dispute.297  
Parties are more likely to be satisfied with agreements that they 
play a central role in creating than orders generated by a judge 
who is less knowledgeable about the circumstances of the parties 
then they are themselves.  Negotiated settlements also free up 
court time to address cases that are resistant to settlement.  
Thus, steps that will result in more settlements of family law 
disputes are generally viewed as being positive. 
Eliminating evaluative mediation will result in more 
settlements in family law cases.  As pointed out above, requiring 
 
 297 See, e.g., Schepard, Kramer, supra note 153, at 682. 
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neutrals to play the conflicting roles of mediator and evaluator 
reduces their effectiveness in the former role, thus decreasing the 
likelihood of mediated agreements.298  Also, parties must 
approach mediation in an adversarial stance, prepared to 
communicate all information that might help them obtain a 
favorable recommendation from the counselor, thus greatly 
increasing their likelihood of success before the court should the 
mediation session fail to produce an agreement.  Yet such an 
adversarial stance is inimical to the kind of cooperative stance 
that is most likely to result in a successful outcome in mediation. 
B. Live Testimony Should Remain Limited in Family Law 
Motion Hearings 
For reasons stated above, the increased use of live testimony 
in family law motion hearings is unlikely to achieve better 
results in such proceedings, will increase adversarialness in 
family law litigation with its corresponding costs, and will 
further contribute to backlogs and delays in the family law 
department at this time of unprecedented budget pressures in 
California. 299  Moreover, the change will not achieve the Elkins 
reforms’ primary goal of making the courts more accessible to 
self-represented litigants, because such litigants are no more 
likely to successfully present their cases through live testimony 
than they would through written submissions. 
Rather than placing the entire burden for solving the 
challenges presented by the explosion of self-representation in 
family court on trial judges who will preside over evidentiary 
hearings, the burden of addressing these challenges should be 
shared equally by the bench, the bar, and court administrators.  
The Judicial Council, counties, courts, and other drafters of 
procedural rules must do a better job of drafting court rules in a 
manner that will be comprehensible to self-represented litigants, 
and will serve as effective guides in helping litigants present 
their issues to the court in a manner that will assist the court in 
reaching a proper result, whether those presentations will take 
place in oral or written form.  New, revised, and simplified court 
forms can play a role in assisting litigants in these tasks.  Such 
rules and forms should be made widely available to litigants via 
the internet, and other technologies for those who do not have 
easy internet access. 
More assistance must also be provided to self-represented 
litigants in preparing their cases, both inside and outside the 
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courthouse.  In addition to free assistance through court based 
and other pro bono programs, the private bar should continue to 
consider means for providing limited legal assistance to self-
represented litigants in preparing their cases to present to the 
court.  Though there has been an increase in the provision of 
such “unbundled” legal services,300 more can be done.  Though it 
is true that many self-represented litigants are too poor to afford 
to pay for any legal services whatsoever, it is clear that many 
self-represented litigants have the means to pay for at least some 
legal services,301 but choose not to do so, either because they don’t 
want to invite the additional adversarialness engendered by 
traditional, full-blown adversary legal representation, or because 
they don’t see the value added in paying for legal services.302  
However, providing limited assistance in preparing cases for 
court might mutually serve both the courts’ and litigants’ 
interests in effective presentation of cases, and attorneys’ 
interests in obtaining business from segments of the population 
who have traditionally declined to employ their services.  
Paralegal and other non-attorney assistance may also be 
appropriate in helping self-represented litigants to prepare their 
cases to be presented effectively in court, to the extent that 
appropriate regulation and quality assurance can be provided for 
such services.303 
Together, these steps should avoid the need for live 
testimony in many motion hearings.  And, retaining the right to 
present any and all necessary testimony should the family law 
dispute require a full trial on the merits, will address the due 
process concerns raised by the California Supreme Court in 
Elkins. 
C. Adopt Traditional Attorney Representation for Children in 
Custody Cases Along with Explicit Recognition of a GAL Role 
The Elkins legislation offers an incoherent role for children’s 
counsel by recasting the role of counsel as a traditional adversary 
advocate in all respects except the most fundamental one, 
advancing the lawful objectives of the client.  California should 
have gone all the way toward allowing “lawyers to be lawyers” in 
custody disputes by eliminating best interests representation.  
On the other hand, California should expressly recognize a role of 
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GAL in custody disputes.  While it will be the rare case where 
both minor’s counsel and a GAL will be employed, authorization 
to appoint a GAL will preserve the opportunity to have an adult 
present the best interests of the child, when the child herself is 
either unable, or unwilling to do so, or there is a serious risk that 
the expressed preference of an older child presents a serious risk 
of harm to the child.  Additionally, the ability of a court to 
appoint a GAL will make up for the elimination of “statements of 
issues and contentions” from the current legislation and present 
the opportunity to provide courts with a thoroughly researched, 
yet relatively objective presentation of the important facts 
relating to the custody determination, in a manner that neither 
the parties’ attorneys, nor the court itself, would otherwise be 
able to provide. 
D. Child Testimony Should Be a Last, Not a First Resort in 
Custody Litigation 
Few would dispute that on the witness stand, testifying in 
one’s parents’ custody case is one of the last places a child would 
want to be.  Legislation that makes it more likely, rather than 
less likely that children will be placed in exactly that position is 
misguided.  While it will certainly be appropriate, indeed even 
necessary in some cases, to have a child testify in custody 
proceedings, the goal should be to limit those instances, rather 
than to increase them.  Pre-existing California law was adequate 
to give judges, parents, lawyers, other professionals, and the 
children themselves, the flexibility to make sure that children 
have an opportunity to be heard regarding custody decisions that 
will have an enormous impact upon their lives, and to determine 
the appropriate manner in which the child’s views will be 
presented.  What is needed is for the involved persons to exercise 
that discretion appropriately, rather than to place a thumb on 
the scale in favor of child testimony. 
CONCLUSION 
Only time will tell if the latest set of family law reforms in 
California will catch on in the rest of the country as has 
happened so many times in the past.  However, it is this author’s 
hope that they do not.  The recent steps back in the direction of 
increased adversarialism in family law litigation mark a 
mistaken reversal of course by a state that led the path away 
from such adversarialism over the past few decades.  Does 
anyone really want to return to the days when custody disputes 
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were a legal “battle to the death,”304 with little concern for the 
casualties created along the way?  Hopefully, other states will 
answer this question “no,” and decline to follow California’s lead 
in family law this time around. 
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